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Modern society is more than ever striving for digital connectivity – everywhere and at any
time, giving rise to megatrends such as the Internet of Things (IoT). Already today, ’things’
communicate and interact autonomously with each other and are managed in networks. In the
future, people, data, and things will be interlinked, which is also referred to as the Internet of
Everything (IoE). Billions of devices will be ubiquitously present in our everyday environment
and are being connected over the Internet. As an emerging technology, printed electronics (PE) is
a key enabler for the IoE offering novel device types with free form factors, new materials, and a
wide range of substrates that can be flexible, transparent, as well as biodegradable. Furthermore,
PE enables new degrees of freedom in circuit customizability, cost-efficiency as well as large-
area fabrication at the point of use. These unique features of PE complement conventional
silicon-based technologies. Additive manufacturing processes enable the realization of many
envisioned applications such as smart objects, flexible displays, wearables in health care, green
electronics, to name but a few.
From the perspective of the IoE, interconnecting billions of heterogeneous devices and systems
is one of the major challenges to be solved. Complex high-performance devices interact with
highly specialized lightweight electronic devices, such as e.g. smartphones and smart sensors.
Data is often measured, stored, and shared continuously with neighboring devices or in the
cloud. Thereby, the abundance of data being collected and processed raises privacy and security
concerns. Conventional cryptographic operations are typically based on deterministic algorithms
requiring high circuit and system complexity, which makes them unsuitable for lightweight
devices.Many applications do exist, where strong cryptographic operations are not required, such
as e.g. in device identification and authentication. Thereby, the security level mainly depends
on the quality of the entropy source and the trustworthiness of the derived keys. Statistical
properties such as the uniqueness of the keys are of great importance to precisely distinguish
between single entities.
In the past decades, hardware-intrinsic security, particularly physically unclonable functions
(PUFs), gained a lot of attraction to provide security features for IoT devices. PUFs use their
inherent variations to derive device-specific unique identifiers, comparable to fingerprints in
biometry. The potentials of this technology include the use of a true source of randomness, on
demand key derivation, as well as inherent key storage.
Combining these potentials with the unique features of PE technology opens up new opportu-
nities to bring security to lightweight electronic devices and systems. Although PE is still far
from being matured and from being as reliable as silicon technology, in this thesis we show that
PE-based PUFs are promising candidates to provide key derivation suitable for device identifica-
tion in the IoE. Thereby, this thesis is primarily concerned with the development, investigation,
and assessment of PE-based PUFs to provide security functionalities to resource constrained
printed devices and systems.
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Abstract
As a first contribution of this thesis, we introduce the scalable PE-based Differential Circuit
PUF (DiffC-PUF) design to provide secure keys to be used in security applications for resource
constrained printed devices. The DiffC-PUF is designed as a hybrid system architecture incor-
porating silicon-based and inkjet-printed components. We develop an embedded PUF platform
to enable large-scale characterization of silicon and printed PUF cores.
In the second contribution of this thesis, we fabricate silicon PUF cores based on discrete
components and perform statistical tests under realistic operating conditions. A comprehensive
experimental analysis on the PUF security metrics is carried out. The results show that the
silicon-based DiffC-PUF exhibits nearly ideal values for the uniqueness and reliability metrics.
Furthermore, the identification capabilities of the DiffC-PUF are investigated and it is shown
that additional post-processing can further improve the quality of the identification system.
In the third contribution of this thesis, we firstly introduce an evaluation workflow to simulate
PE-based DiffC-PUFs, also called hybrid PUFs. Hereof, we introduce a Python-based simulation
environment to investigate the characteristics and variations of printed PUF cores based onMon-
te Carlo (MC) simulations. The simulation results show, that the security metrics to be expected
from the fabricated devices are close to ideal at the best operating point. Secondly, we employ
fabricated printed PUF cores for statistical tests under varying operating conditions including
variations in ambient temperature, relative humidity, and supply voltage. The evaluations of
the uniqueness, bit aliasing, and uniformity metrics are in good agreement with the simulation
results. The experimentally determined mean reliability value is relatively low, which can be
explained by the missing passivation and encapsulation of the printed transistors. The investiga-
tion of the identification capabilities based on the raw PUF responses shows that the pure hybrid
PUF is not suitable for cryptographic applications, but qualifies for device identification tasks.
The final contribution is to switch to the perspective of an attacker. To judge on the security ca-
pabilities of the hybrid PUF, a comprehensive security analysis in the manner of a cryptanalysis
is performed. The analysis of the entropy of the hybrid PUF shows that its vulnerability against
model-based attacks mainly depends on the selected challenge building method. Furthermo-
re, an attack methodology is introduced to assess the performances of different mathematical
cloning attacks on the basis of eavesdropped challenge-response pairs (CRPs). To clone the
hybrid PUF, a sorting algorithm is introduced and compared with commonly used supervised
machine learning (ML) classifiers including logistic regression (LR), random forest (RF), as well
as multi-layer perceptron (MLP). The results show that the hybrid PUF is vulnerable against
model-based attacks. The sorting algorithm benefits from shorter training times compared to




Die moderne Gesellschaft strebt mehr denn je nach digitaler Konnektivität – überall und zu
jeder Zeit – was zu Megatrends wie dem Internet der Dinge (Internet of Things, IoT) führt.
Bereits heute kommunizieren und interagieren „Dinge“ autonom miteinander und werden in
Netzwerken verwaltet. In Zukunft werden Menschen, Daten und Dinge miteinander verbunden
sein, was auch als Internet von Allem (Internet of Everything, IoE) bezeichnet wird. Milliarden
von Geräten werden in unserer täglichen Umgebung allgegenwärtig sein und über das Inter-
net in Verbindung stehen. Als aufstrebende Technologie ist die gedruckte Elektronik (Printed
Electronics, PE) ein Schlüsselelement für das IoE, indem sie neuartige Gerätetypen mit freien
Formfaktoren, neuen Materialien auf einer Vielzahl von Substraten mit sich bringt, die flexibel,
transparent und biologisch abbaubar sein können. Darüber hinaus ermöglicht PE neue Frei-
heitsgrade bei der Anpassbarkeit von Schaltkreisen sowie die kostengünstige und großflächige
Herstellung am Einsatzort. Diese einzigartigen Eigenschaften von PE ergänzen herkömmliche
Technologien auf Siliziumbasis. Additive Fertigungsprozesse ermöglichen die Realisierung von
vielen zukunftsträchtigen Anwendungen wie intelligente Objekte, flexible Displays, Wearables
im Gesundheitswesen, umweltfreundliche Elektronik, um einige zu nennen.
Aus der Sicht des IoE ist die Integration und Verbindung von Milliarden heterogener Geräte
und Systeme eine der größten zu lösenden Herausforderungen. Komplexe Hochleistungsge-
räte interagieren mit hochspezialisierten, leichtgewichtigen elektronischen Geräten, wie z.B.
Smartphones mit intelligenten Sensoren. Daten werden in der Regel kontinuierlich gemessen,
gespeichert und mit benachbarten Geräten oder in der Cloud ausgetauscht. Dabei wirft die Fül-
le an gesammelten und verarbeiteten Daten Bedenken hinsichtlich des Datenschutzes und der
Sicherheit auf. Herkömmliche kryptografische Operationen basieren typischerweise auf deter-
ministischen Algorithmen, die eine hohe Schaltungs- und Systemkomplexität erfordern, was sie
wiederum für viele leichtgewichtige Geräte ungeeignet macht. Es existieren viele Anwendungs-
bereiche, in denen keine komplexen kryptografischen Operationen erforderlich sind, wie z.B. bei
der Geräteidentifikation und -authentifizierung. Dabei hängt das Sicherheitslevel hauptsächlich
von der Qualität der Entropiequelle und der Vertrauenswürdigkeit der abgeleiteten Schlüssel ab.
Statistische Eigenschaften wie die Einzigartigkeit (Uniqueness) der Schlüssel sind von großer
Bedeutung, um einzelne Entitäten genau unterscheiden zu können.
In den letzten Jahrzehnten hat die Hardware-intrinsische Sicherheit, insbesondere Physically
Unclonable Functions (PUFs), eine große Strahlkraft hinsichtlich der Bereitstellung von Si-
cherheitsfunktionen für IoT-Geräte erlangt. PUFs verwenden ihre inhärenten Variationen, um
gerätespezifische eindeutige Kennungen abzuleiten, die mit Fingerabdrücken in der Biometrie
vergleichbar sind. Zu den größten Potenzialen dieser Technologie gehören die Verwendung einer
echten Zufallsquelle, die Ableitung von Sicherheitsschlüsseln nach Bedarf sowie die inhärente
Schlüsselspeicherung.
In Kombination mit den einzigartigen Merkmalen der PE-Technologie werden neue Möglich-
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keiten eröffnet, um leichtgewichtige elektronische Geräte und Systeme abzusichern. Obwohl
PE noch weit davon entfernt ist, so ausgereift und zuverlässig wie die Siliziumtechnologie zu
sein, wird in dieser Arbeit gezeigt, dass PE-basierte PUFs vielversprechende Sicherheitspri-
mitiven für die Schlüsselgenerierung zur eindeutigen Geräteidentifikation im IoE sind. Dabei
befasst sich diese Arbeit in erster Linie mit der Entwicklung, Untersuchung und Bewertung von
PE-basierten PUFs, um Sicherheitsfunktionen für ressourcenbeschränkte gedruckte Geräte und
Systeme bereitzustellen.
Im ersten Beitrag dieser Arbeit stellen wir das skalierbare, auf gedruckter Elektronik basie-
rende Differential Circuit PUF (DiffC-PUF) Design vor, um sichere Schlüssel für Sicherheits-
anwendungen für ressourcenbeschränkte Geräte bereitzustellen. Die DiffC-PUF ist als hybride
Systemarchitektur konzipiert, die siliziumbasierte und gedruckte Komponenten enthält. Es wird
eine eingebettete PUF-Plattform entwickelt, um die Charakterisierung von siliziumbasierten und
gedruckten PUF-Cores in großem Maßstab zu ermöglichen.
Im zweiten Beitrag dieser Arbeit werden siliziumbasierte PUF-Cores auf Basis diskreter Kom-
ponenten hergestellt und statistische Tests unter realistischen Betriebsbedingungen durchgeführt.
Eine umfassende experimentelle Analyse der PUF-Sicherheitsmetriken wird vorgestellt. Die Er-
gebnisse zeigen, dass die DiffC-PUF auf Siliziumbasis nahezu ideale Werte für die Uniqueness-
und Reliability-Metriken aufweist. Darüber hinaus werden die Identifikationsfähigkeiten der
DiffC-PUF untersucht, und es stellte sich heraus, dass zusätzliches Post-Processing die Identifi-
zierbarkeit des Identifikationssystems weiter verbessern kann.
Im dritten Beitrag dieser Arbeit wird zunächst ein Evaluierungsworkflow zur Simulation von
DiffC-PUFs basierend auf gedruckter Elektronik vorgestellt, welche auch als Hybrid-PUFs be-
zeichnet werden. Hierbei wird eine Python-basierte Simulationsumgebung vorgestellt, welche
es ermöglicht, die Eigenschaften und Variationen gedruckter PUF-Cores basierend auf Monte
Carlo (MC) Simulationen zu untersuchen. Die Simulationsergebnisse zeigen, dass die Sicher-
heitsmetriken im besten Betriebspunkt nahezu ideal sind. Des Weiteren werden angefertigte
PE-basierte PUF-Cores für statistische Tests unter verschiedenen Betriebsbedingungen, ein-
schließlich Schwankungen der Umgebungstemperatur, der relativen Luftfeuchtigkeit und der
Versorgungsspannung betrieben. Die experimentell bestimmten Resultate der Uniqueness-, Bit-
Aliasing- und Uniformity-Metriken stimmen gut mit den Simulationsergebnissen überein. Der
experimentell ermittelte durchschnittliche Reliability-Wert ist relativ niedrig, was durch die feh-
lende Passivierung und Einkapselung der gedruckten Transistoren erklärt werden kann. Die
Untersuchung der Identifikationsfähigkeiten basierend auf den PUF-Responses zeigt, dass die
Hybrid-PUF ohne zusätzliches Post-Processing nicht für kryptografische Anwendungen geeig-
net ist. Die Ergebnisse zeigen aber auch, dass sich die Hybrid-PUF zur Geräteidentifikation
eignet.
Der letzte Beitrag besteht darin, in die Perspektive eines Angreifers zu wechseln. Um die Sicher-
heitsfähigkeiten der Hybrid-PUF beurteilen zu können, wird eine umfassende Sicherheitsanalyse
nach Art einer Kryptoanalyse durchgeführt. Die Analyse der Entropie der Hybrid-PUF zeigt,
dass seine Anfälligkeit für Angriffe auf Modellbasis hauptsächlich von der eingesetzten Me-
thode zur Generierung der PUF-Challenges abhängt. Darüber hinaus wird ein Angriffsmodell
eingeführt, um die Leistung verschiedener mathematischer Klonangriffe auf der Grundlage von
abgehörten Challenge-Response Pairs (CRPs) zu bewerten. Um die Hybrid-PUF zu klonen, wird
ein Sortieralgorithmus eingeführt und mit häufig verwendeten Classifiers für überwachtes ma-
schinelles Lernen (ML) verglichen, einschließlich logistischer Regression (LR), Random Forest
x
(RF) sowieMulti-Layer Perceptron (MLP). Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Hybrid-PUF anfällig
für modellbasierte Angriffe ist. Der Sortieralgorithmus profitiert von kürzeren Trainingszeiten
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In the past years, computing devices have become ubiquitous in our everyday life and the mo-
dern society is more than ever striving for digital connectivity. Megatrends such as the Internet
of Things (IoT), where devices communicate and interact autonomously with each other, have
become real and gain more and more popularity all over the world. Recently, the IoT is evolving
to the so-called Internet of Everything (IoE) describing the interconnection of people, data, and
things (objects) through processes. Billions of devices are being connected over the Internet [1].
The application areas are numerous reaching from home automation [2, 3], energy manage-
ment [4,5], transportation [6,7], industry [8,9] up to health care [10,11] and wearables [12,13].
Information can be gathered and processed continuously to provide real-time services to humans
and machines anytime and anywhere. Thereby, data is often not retraceable to the originator,
be it a human being or a machine. This rises privacy and security concerns, since personalized
information can fall into wrong hands without knowledge and consent of the consumer.
In this regard, platform architectures have been introduced to attain security and trust in network-
based ecosystems. Examples include the widely used Trusted Platform Module (TPM) archi-
tecture [14], design guidelines (e.g. NIST 800-160 [15]), and standards (e.g. IEC 62443 [16])
for security in information systems. Cryptography provides the tools to secure communication
channels and to prevent data abuse. The most commonly used cryptographic algorithms include
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) [17], Blowfish [18], Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [19]
to name but a few. In this context, random number generators (RNGs) are often used to generate
random binary sequences. On that basis, cryptographic keys for data encryption and decryption
can be generated and stored in the device’s non-volatile memory (NVM). As a consequence, the
security level of the system depends on the trustworthiness of the stored secrets, which is also
referred to as the root of trust (RoT). This rises security threats particularly concerning devices
operated in untrusted environments by making them prone to physical attacks. Making NVMs
secure against physical attacks requires costly anti-tamper measures [20]. This is conflicting
to the concept of the IoE, where heterogeneous devices and systems of different complexities
are interconnected and exchange information. As a result, conventional cryptographic security
solutions may not be suitable for lightweight electronic systems [21].
One promising solution to tackle the aforementioned challenges is hardware-intrinsic security,
in particular physically unclonable functions (PUFs). PUFs are specifically designed for light-
weight identification, authentication, and cryptographic key generation. PUFs make use of their
inherent variations to produce random signatures in the form of a device-specific fingerprint. The
internal physical characteristics of the PUF are uncontrollably induced during the fabrication
process. Since the device-specific signature is permanently present in the PUF, security keys can
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Figure 1.1: Internet of Everything and printed electronics technology. (a) Flexible electronic circuit [22], (b)
printed flexible display [22], (c) example of PE-based green electronics [23], (d) printed patch with
an integrated sensor [24], (e) smart packaging including a printed sensor [25], and (f) wearable with
PE-based electronics [25].
Emerging technologies such as printed electronics (PE) bring innovations by enabling novel
device types with free form factors, new materials, and based on large-area fabrication. PE is
contrary to conventional silicon-based technology and therefore acts as a key enabler for elec-
tronic devices and systems that can be seamlessly integrated into our everyday environment.
This will further push the evolution of the IoE by bringing billions of lightweight devices to the
market. Potential target applications for PE technology include flexible electronics [22], flexible
displays [22], green electronics [23], health care [24], smart objects [25], and wearables [25]
as shown in Figure 1.1. Compared to lithographically structured devices, larger variations can
be expected due to the additive manufacturing process [26–31]. Moreover, PE-based systems
are often subject to strict design and performance constraints, which also limits the security
capabilities. In this context, PUFs are promising candidates to overcome these issues and to pro-
vide security for lightweight PE-based electronic devices by benefiting from the high variations
being used as a true source of randomness. Furthermore, the unique features of PE technology,
such as decentralized manufacturing, help to establish root of trust (RoT) in the manufacturing
supply chain. This thesis deals with the investigation of PE-based PUFs for the use as lightweight
security primitives to enable information and cyber security.
1.2 Research Objectives
This work tackles the challenges arising from lightweight PE-based devices and systems in
the IoE regarding their security. In this context, the term ’PE-based’ describes fully printed
and hybrid systems incorporating silicon-based and printed components. The approaches and
scientific results presented in this work are based on the subsequent research questions:
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• Q1:Which state of the art approaches are best suited to provide security features for
PE-based devices and systems?
PE technology brings novel device types with free form factors, new materials, enables
large-area fabrication, and therefore acts as a key enabler for the IoE. At the same time,
PE technology is subject to strict design and performance constraints, which strengthens
the need for lightweight security solutions. This analysis will help in finding promising
technical solutions based on hardware-intrinsic security.
• Q2: How can a PUF be designed to meet the requirements for PE fabrication?
To find a suitable PUF circuit design that can be fabricated with PE technology, it is
required to investigate the variations of printed components based on simulations and
experimental measurements.
• Q3: How can the PUF characteristics be measured and the security performance be
evaluated?
To assess the security performance of the PUF, it is essential to evaluate the security
metrics and compare the results with other works.
• Q4: Which security threats do arise for PE-based PUFs?
The research activities of PE-based PUFs are in the very beginning and the security threats
might differ from silicon-based technology. It is required to investigate the vulnerabilities
of the proposed PUF and compare the results with other works.
• Q5: Which potential target applications do exist for the proposed PE-based PUF?
Based on the obtained results on the security metrics and the attack resistance, potential
target application shall be identified.
1.3 Thesis Structure
In this thesis, we study PE-based PUF designs, security metrics, security threats as well as
applications both from a conceptual and from a practical perspective. Figure 1.2 shows how the
thesis is organized and these subjects relate to each other.
In Chapter 2, we introduce the foundations of security from a technical perspective with the
focus on hardware-intrinsic security. In this respect, we focus on PE technology and its relevance
as a key-driver for the IoE. This overview serves as an introduction into the state of the art of
hardware-intrinsic security research.
In Chapter 3, we identify requirements on PUFs to qualify for specific applications. Based
on our analysis on the requirements for PE-based PUFs, we introduce the Differential Circuit
PUF (DiffC-PUF) design. To enable experimental evaluations on fabricated PUFs, a modular
embedded PUF evaluation platform based on discrete silicon electronics is also introduced.
We published the platform design and the corresponding software implementations in [32, 33].
Moreover, we explain the printing process to fabricate PE-based PUF core circuits and their
integration into the evaluation platform.
In Chapter 4, we employ silicon-based PUF cores to investigate the performance in terms of
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Figure 1.2: Organization of the research objectives in the thesis and its chapters.
based PUFs under changing operating conditions and obtain a data basis for statistical security
metric evaluations. On that basis, the identification capabilities of the PUFs are assessed and
compared with related works. The results discussed in this chapter are based on our published
works in [33].
In Chapter 5, we employ printed PUF cores in combination with the silicon-based embedded
evaluation platform to investigate the performance in terms of security metrics and identification
capabilities.
In Chapter 6, we focus on security threats in general and emanating for PE-based PUFs. Based
on the herein introduced PUF architecture, we investigate the entropy of the PUF responses and
perform model-based attacks. This also includes a specially developed sorting algorithm as well
as various machine learning (ML) techniques to model the PUF. To conclude, the performances
of the employed algorithms are compared.
In Chapter 7, we conclude the most important findings of this thesis and propose interesting
future research directions.
4
2 Background & State of the Art
2.1 Introduction
In the last decades wired and wireless communication technologies have become drivers of the
IoE by enabling scalability and flexible deployment. Networks comprise heterogeneous devices
and systems with diverse computing performance and design constraints. However, there is
a number of challenges ahead in terms of security, privacy, and trust. The variety of parties
being involved in the IoE makes it hard to establish consistent security standards. Furthermore,
emerging technologies such as PE strengthen the need after security solutions for lightweight
electronics. In the past two decades, hardware-intrinsic security emerged as a promising approach
to inherently provide security functionalities to electronic devices. Various so-called physically
unclonable function (PUF) constructions have been introduced for the use in different security
applications.
Being the main subject of this thesis, it is important to introduce the basic concepts of hardware-
intrinsic security in the light of PUFs. In the subsequent sections of this chapter, an overview of
security in general, state of the art PUF designs, and security metrics is given. Furthermore, PE
is introduced with regard to security as well as existing PE-based PUFs are reviewed. Finally,
security threats in terms of eavesdropping and model-based attacks are presented. The herein
outlined topics are the foundations for the subsequent chapters.
2.2 Security in the Age of Digitization
2.2.1 Security & Privacy
Security plays a major role in the modern world while touching our everyday life in a variety of
aspects. As per definition, the term security relates to the physical protection of human beings
or objects, but also covers observation, detection, and prevention. For example, to keep valuable
assets secure one can register a bank account or rent a safe deposit locker for physical protection.
The bank strictly limits the access to the bank’s employees and logs all interactions to detect
misbehavior. Since a bank robbery is per law defined as a criminal act, the asset is further
protected by the legislator which allows for and enforces punishment for the caught culprit.
In the past, relatively simple security mechanisms were applicable for human non-digital in-
teractions. In most cases, physical protection could be guaranteed based on entrance controls
and face-to-face authentication. However, in our more and more digitized world, these security
mechanisms are no longer sufficient to enable comprehensive security. Many interactions have
been shifted to digital services in online systems, e.g. on websites or in smartphone applications.
To stay with the former example, a bank’s customer using the online banking system can not be
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authenticated face-to-face. Moreover, a digital thief could use the same login data of any other
person and delegate money transfers. To detect such unauthorized access, security measures
need to be introduced for the digital world. In this regard, many technical security solutions
have been proposed in the past decades, such as multi-factor authentication methods [34], cryp-
tography [35], or biometry [36]. Furthermore, the legislation must provide laws that allow for
prosecution in cybercrime. This is a major issue, since cyber criminals are often spread around
the world and it is difficult to locate them. Even when identified, cyber criminals often avoid








Figure 2.1: Information security CIA triad.
After this general discussion about the broad meaning of security in our everyday life, we now
want to examine the basic protective goals of information security and privacy. This is very
important due to the massive data exchange over highly heterogeneous distributed systems in
the digitized world. Figure 2.1 shows the fundamental concepts of information security, which
is also known as the CIA triad. The abbreviation CIA describes the properties confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. Thereby, the essence of confidentiality is the access restriction to
ensure that information is only shared with parties being authorized. Integrity ensures that
information is not altered and truly represents what it is intended. The third property of the
CIA triad is the availability describing that information can be accessed and modified by any
authorized party within an appropriate time frame [37]. In [38] Cerdantseva et al. provide a
comprehensive overview on information security. Because of the multidisciplinary field, the
following extended version of the CIA triad can be found in literature: confidentiality, integrity,
availability, authenticity, non-repudiation, and privacy [38, 39]. One of the fundamental tools
to ensure information security is authentication. In this context, authenticity guarantees that no
unauthorized party can gain access and modify private information, which is the basis for the
CIA triad. Non-repudiation refers to the verifiability of the information, which can be achieved
e.g. through electronic signatures. The privacy property is directly included to the information
security requirements. In general, privacy relates to the right one has to control the personal
information. It is less about protecting data from attacks than it provides transparency upon
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which data is collected, stored, and shared with others. In the next section, we elaborate more
on the term trust and discuss its meaning for security.
2.2.2 Trust
The term trust describes the belief that someone or something is secure and reliable. Therefore,
it is directly linked with security and forms the basis for authentication. The entire society is
based on trust relations between individuals and complex systems. Because of this fact, manifold
motives for being trustworthy do exist in the real world. For example, companies that want to
sell products have more success if their image is good. Good images are mainly an outcome
of the experience customers have made with the products of a brand. In this regard, many
criminals try to copy original products and trade on the customer’s trust. In the past, perpetrators
could be detected more easily due to the direct relation between the interacting parties, e.g. the
customer and the shop. In times of a widely interconnected world with complex and hence, often
vast supply chains, distinguishing between originals and counterfeits can be very difficult. For
example, many malicious traders in online shops advertise their counterfeits as originals and
make use of the customer’s trust. If we transfer this to digital, interconnected, and autonomously
acting systems exchanging data, the trustworthiness of each single device and all data sources
must be guaranteed. This highlights the need for trustworthy security solutions that can be
applied to all parties. This is what we call trust by means of security in a pervasive manner.
In times of the Internet of Things (IoT) and the Internet of Everything (IoE), which describe
the interconnection of human beings, devices, processes, data, and objects, securing the ’things’
as well as the communication are vital factors. Many IoT devices are exposed to security
vulnerabilities due to strict hardware limitations such as low computational performance and
leakage of memory [40]. To provide standards on how to build secure IoT devices, design
frameworks such as e.g. the Platform Security Architecture (PSA) by ARM Ltd [41] have been
introduced. The aim of these design frameworks is to enable a strong and flexible protection
for the root of trust, which is immutable over the lifetime of a device [42]. In this context, the
terms immutable root of trust and trust anchor are widely used for the fixed and tamper resistant
hardware security resources in a device. All subsequent trust, also called chain of trust, depends
on this root/anchor. For the sake of simplicity, we prefer to use the term root of trust (RoT).
Figure 2.2 shows the relations between root of trust, physical security, information security, and
privacy objectives.
In general, RoT is based on secrets also referred to as root keys. There are two traditional ways to
generate root keys. The first method is to inject the keys into the devices during themanufacturing
process. After injection, the root key is stored in a one-time programmable non-volatile memory
(NVM). The drawbacks of this method are that runtime key generation is not possible and that
the key itself does not originate from the device itself. In this case, the root key is similar to
a programmed fingerprint, which implies a further security threat in terms of manipulation. In
this context, please note that secret keys are just as trustworthy as their origin [33]. The second
method to generate root keys is to use an internal random number generator (RNG). In this
case, root keys can be changed by using the RNG. Furthermore, an NVM is required that can be
reprogrammed, such as electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) and
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flash memory. The main drawback of this approach is the storage of the root keys which implies
a vulnerability against reverse-engineering attacks.





















































Figure 2.2: Relations between root of trust, physical security, information security, and privacy (cf. [43]).
2.2.3 Cryptology
Cryptology encompasses the subfields cryptography and cryptanalysis. Cryptography deals with
the construction of protocols and algorithms to achieve information security goals. On the other
hand, cryptanalysis analyzes the security of cryptographic constructions by attempting to break
their security. The basic principle of cryptology is that a cryptographic construction can only be
considered secure if its internal workings are general knowledge and have successfully withstood
cryptanalysis attempts from independent parties [43].




Figure 2.3: Classification of cryptology.
Cryptography was initially concerned with providing secrecy for written messages. In general,
the secret information known only be the legitimate parties is the so-called key. The key is used to
transform plaintext into a ciphertext (also called cipher), which is also referred to as encryption.
In computer technology, it is distinguished between symmetric ciphers and asymmetric ciphers.
The former includes algorithms such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [19], the
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Data Encryption Standard (DES) [44], and Blowfish [18]. Widely used asymmetric ciphers
are Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) [45], Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [46], and the Diffie-
Hellman-Merkle key exchange protocol [47, 48]. For an extensive overview on cryptographic
primitives please refer to [49].
2.2.4 One-Way Functions
Two-way functions are widely used in mathematics exhibiting a predictable dependency between
the input and output variable, and vice versa. However, in information security it is not desired
that generated keys are reversible. In contrast, a one-way function (OWF) is a function that is easy
to compute in the forward direction, but hard or infeasible to invert.OWFs are widely used in the
security area, such as cryptography to encrypt message transmission. In this context, algorithmic
one-way functions (AOWFs) play a major role being defined as one-way functions that can be
expressed as a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. Basically, the theoretic one-way feature
is not verifiable, but in practice it is typically sufficient to achieve a negligible probability
of inversion. In this conjunction, the stringent property of one-wayness or non-invertibility is
replaced by a probabilistic measure of unpredictability.
Besides AOWFs, the intrinsic random variations of physical materials or devices can be used
to identify individuals, objects, or systems. For example in the nineteenth century, fingerprint
identification of human beings have been introduced which has led to the research field of
biometrics. In the later twentieth century, random patterns in material surfaces were used for
unique identification based on optical inspections.
In 2001, Pappu [50] introduced a generic definition of physical one-way functions (POWFs),
which refers to the state of a physical system that may be dependent on the physical properties
of the system itself.
Definition 2.1. A function is a physical one-way function, if [50]:
• there exists a deterministic physical interaction between the probe and the system which
produces an output in constant time,
• inverting the function using either computational or physical means is difficult,
• simulating the physical interaction is computationally demanding,
• the physical system is easy to make but difficult to clone.
Another early work in this field was proposed by Gassend [51], introducing the term physical
random function (PRF). A PRF is a function that maps an input-stimulus, namely a challenge,
to an output measure, also referred to as the response.
Definition 2.2. A function is a physical random function, if [51]:
• the physical device is capable of evaluating the function in a short amount of time (easy
to evaluate),
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• from a limited number of plausible physical measurements or queries of chosen challenge-
response pairs (CRPs), an attacker who no longer has the device, and who can only
use a limited amount of resources (time, money, raw material, etc.) can only extract a
negligible amount of information about the response to a randomly chosen challenge
(hard to characterize).
2.2.5 Security from Intrinsic Process Variations
In the past decades, physical attacks and information leakage turned out as possible security
threats for integrated circuits. Many research groups started to develop and investigate coun-
termeasures to these attacks. Particularly side-channel attacks gained a lot of attention. As a
promising solution, the emerging research field of hardware-intrinsic security is dealing with
secure key generation and storage. In this regard, secure keys are generated based on the in-
trinsic properties of materials and electronic devices, e.g. from physically unclonable functions
(PUFs). In silicon technology, process variations can be categorized as wafer-to-wafer (W2W),
die-to-die (D2D), and within-die (WID) variations [52]. WID process variations can be split into
systematic and random components. The systematic component shows spatial correlations and
leads to similar properties in devices that are laid out close. In contrast, the random component
shows no correlations across devices and varies arbitrarily [53]. Several device parameters may
vary due to process variations such as gate width, device threshold voltage, channel length, oxide
thickness, to name but a few [52]. These facts play a major role in hardware-intrinsic security,
which aims to utilize these phenomenons as a security feature.
As the unique identifiers/keys are inherently present in PUFs in the form of unique physical
characteristics, the random intrinsic process variations are used as a pre-initialized non-volatile
read-only memory. This means that no permanent key storage is required and that the keys are
only present in the digital form for a limited time once generated. This denotes an important
security advantage compared to non-volatile memory, whose contents are retained even after
powering off the integrated circuit [54]. As a consequence, any physical attack attempting to
extract information from the PUF must be carried out while the chip is powered on. It is difficult
to execute invasive attacks without modifying the physical characteristics of the PUF itself.
Compared to secure digital storage, no continually powered active anti-tamper mechanisms
are required to secure the PUF [55]. Another advantage is that the keys can not be influenced
from the outside, not even by the manufacturer. To that effect, the secure key derivation is
shifted to the hardware, which makes PUFs suitable for lightweight devices and systems. When
we talk about ’lightweight’ in this context, we think of devices and systems that underlie
strict constraints in terms of computing performance, memory, peripherals, area, and power
consumption. This allows to utilize lightweight authentication protocols [56, 57] without the
need to perform complex cryptographic operations. These unique properties make hardware-
intrinsic security a promising research direction for the futurewith a highly practical relevance for
many applications. PUF approaches can already be found in commercial products, as discussed
in Section 2.5.4. For the sake of completeness, we also mention that other hardware-based
concepts such as block and stream ciphers belong to the field of hardware security as well.
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2.2.6 Fundamental Security Performance Measures
To assess the quality of security keys, a variety of performance measures do exist. The following
definitions describe the fundamental security metrics, mainly originating from information
theory.
Hamming Distance
The security keys used in computer technology are typically represented by digital bit strings,
whose binary bit values are randomly distributed. Different forms of distance measures do exist
to compute the distance dist(G, H) between two abstract elements G and H. In information theory
the hamming distance (HD) is a widely used metric to measure the distance between two bit
strings of equal length.
Definition 2.3. The hamming distance between two binary bit strings - = {G0, . . . , G!−1} and




G; ⊕ H; . (2.1)
In many cases it is useful to have a normalized distance metric, i.e. when comparing hamming
distances obtained for different key bit widths. The so called fractional hamming distance (FHD)
computes normalized distance values between [0, 1].
Definition 2.4. The fractional hamming distance between two binary bit strings - and . of
equal length ! is:
FHD(-,. ) = 1
!
· HD(-,. ). (2.2)
Entropy
In cyber security, entropy is a measure of the randomness of a data-generating function and
represents the foundation for cryptographic functions [58]. Particularly with regard to one-way
functions, full entropy means that no patterns can be found in the mathematical mapping. In
contrast, low entropy means that patterns can be detected being used to predict other values. In
cryptography, high entropy is needed to generate binary sequences used for encryption and hash
functions. In this context, the term entropy source is frequently used in literature which describes
the source of randomness. Potential entropy sources are numerous, but the most commonly used
are based on hardware such as for example physical variations. In this context, it is distinguished
between true sources of randomness and pseudo-randomness. The former is typically based
on stochastic physical process variations in hardware. In contrast, pseudo-random numbers
are mostly computer-generated using computational deterministic algorithms. The definition of
entropy was introduced by Shannon in [59] with regard to data communication.
In the binary range of numbers, the information entropy  and the maximum entropy max for
# symbols are defined according to Equation (2.3) and Equation (2.4), respectively.
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%(I) · log2(%(I)) (2.3)
where %(·) is the probability mass function. An entropy value of 1 means that the keys exhibit
the maximum information content.
Definition 2.6. The maximum entropy max for # symbols is:
max = log2(#) (2.4)
The normalized entropy, also referred to as efficiency [, is defined according to Equation (2.5).







%(I) · log# (%(I)). (2.5)
where %(·) is the probability mass function and # is the number of symbols.
Another option is to determine the so-called minimum entropy (min-entropy) of a binary source,
as recommended in the NIST specification 800-90 [60]. The min-entropy estimate is a more
conservative measure than the Shannon entropy, since the min-entropy value is always less. In
the case of the binary range of numbers, for each binary value 0 and 1, the probabilities of
occurrence ?0 and ?1 are calculated. The maximum probability ?max = max(?0, ?1) is used to
estimate the min-entropy.
Definition 2.8. The worst-case entropy, the so-called min-entropy min, for a random variable
is:
min = −log2(?max) (2.6)
where ?max is the maximum probability value.
Bias
In cryptography, the binary values of the security keys should be equally distributed. If a key-
generating function outputs bit strings that are biased towards 0 or 1, the overall key entropy
is reduced. This means that attackers can find patterns and predict other keys. In general, the
entropy and the bias metrics are strongly correlated when assessing the security performance.
We decided to use the generic term bias in the context of security. Particularly in the field of
PUFs the term bit aliasing is more common [61].







whereΦ=,8 is the =-th key. A bias value of 0.5 denotes that 0s and 1s are equally distributed. Bias
values less or greater than 0.5 indicate that the corresponding bit position is biased towards 0
or 1, respectively.
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2.3 Physically Unclonable Functions – Concepts and Definitions
2.3.1 PUF Definition & Properties
A physically unclonable function (PUF) is a one-way expression of an inherent and unclonable
instance-specific feature of a physical object, comparable to biometric features of human beings
like fingerprints. From a more technical point of view, a PUF is a physical device representing
a function that maps challenges to responses. It should be easy to evaluate the function, but
hard to characterize by measurements [62]. The term physical(ly) unclonable function (PUF)
has established as the most commonly used denotation in literature.
Awide variety of PUF constructions have been proposed, coveringmany differentmanufacturing
technologies, materials, and physical phenomenons. The earliest works presented by Pappu [50],
Gassend [51], Maes et al. in [63], and Armknecht et al. [64] deal with the generic description of
PUFs and the true properties being required. All definitions include the properties of uniqueness,
unpredictability, and unclonability. In this section, we introduce the most important properties
of PUFs based on a comprehensive literature research.
Uniqueness
The uniqueness property describes how uncorrelated PUF responses are across different hard-
ware instances. In a given set of PUF instances, each single PUF shall be clearly recognizable
due to its CRP set. The number of CRPs required to identify a PUF instance might differ depen-
ding on the uniqueness of the PUF responses. The uniqueness measure is provided by the inter
hamming distance (inter-HD) introduced in Section 2.3.4.
Unpredictability
The unpredictability property is strongly connected with unclonability, but is not limited to
it. In the context of PUFs, unpredictability means that CRPs must be independent to make it
impossible for an attacker to predict other CRPs with that knowledge.
Unclonability
In most definitions, the unclonability property is the core property of a PUF and refers to the
impossibility of an attacker to create a physical clone. Since PUFs rely on the random manufac-
turing variations of physical devices, unclonability also includes that the physical characteristics
being used for the PUF output generation must be out of control from the manufacturer. This
ensures that no specific replicates of PUFs can be fabricated. At this point we also want to
discuss the difference between the terms physical and physically unclonable functions, which
both can be found in literature. In literature the term physical is more widespread and defines
a physical object that is hard to be cloned in any way. In this context, Maes et al. [63] bind
the properties uniqueness with physical unclonability and unpredictability with mathematical
unclonability. This definition seems to be more appropriate, especially in the light of recent
research activities in this field. By definition it should be hard to create a physical clone of a
PUF, even for the actual manufacturer. If we can not produce a physical clone we use the adverb
and say that the PUF is physically unclonable. In this case we believe that the term physically is
more fitting. This argument strengthens if we consider that most of the PUF designs have been
mathematically cloned using model-based attacks.
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Reproducibility
The reproducibility property describes that PUF responses should be equal (or at least close)
when applying the same challenge. This property distinguishes PUFs from true random number
generators (TRNGs), which are supposed to output random bit strings independent from outside
influences. The reproducibility measure is provided by the intra hamming distance (intra-HD)
introduced in Section 2.3.4.
One-Wayness
The one-wayness property goes back to the earliest definitions of PUFs which are described in
Section 2.2.4. The origin of one-way functions can be found in cryptography.
Tamper Evidence
In the early years of PUF research, mainly optical PUF constructions have been proposed where
tamper evidencewas a useful property. Recent PUF constructions are mainly based on variations
that lead to unique electrical characteristics of circuits. In this regard, tamper evidence is hard
to achieve and therefore faded into the background in the past years. Since most of the PUF
constructions do not provide this property, it does not qualify for a generic definition of PUF
properties. Nonetheless, we want to mention that latest research activities in the field of novel
material science are promising to provide tamper evidence for electrical PUFs in the future.
2.3.2 Challenges and Responses
A PUF is a physical one-way function that takes an input, the so-called challenge, and produces
one or multiple output bits, namely the response '. Depending on the PUF construction,
challenges can adopt different forms. For example in optical PUFs, challenges often consist of
coordinates and angles to focus a laser beam on the surface to be evaluated [65]. In electrical
PUFs, challengesmainly comprise binary bit strings that specify the internal PUF configuration.
The tuples (8, '8) are called challenge-response pairs (CRPs), where 8 denotes the index of the
challenge and the corresponding response.
Definition 2.10. The PUF response '8 for a given challenge 8 is:
'8 = 5PUF(8) (2.8)
where 5PUF(·) is the PUF behavior expressed as a function and 8 is the index of the challenge
and the corresponding response.
2.3.3 Weak and Strong PUFs
In the past years, many PUF constructions have been introduced based on different methods to
evaluate process variations. This led to the question which properties can be compared with each
other. One comparable property is the number of CRPs that can be generated from a certain
PUF. In this regard, the categorization of weak and strong PUFs was introduced.
Weak PUFs exhibit a low number of CRPs, in the extreme case just a single CRP. More
specifically, in weak PUFs the CRP space scales polynomially (often linearly) with the area
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footprint. Weak PUFs are also referred to as physical obfuscated keys (POKs) [51]. Typical
application scenarios include private key generation. To protect the secret key(s) from attackers,
the interfaces are often obfuscated by applying additional hash functions to the PUF responses.
This PUF configuration is also called controlled PUF [51].
In contrast, strong PUFs can produce large numbers of individual CRPs and scale exponentially.
The extent CRP space allows to use each CRP for a single time and then mark it as expired.
In theory, the CRP must not even be hidden from attackers. Possible target applications include
authentications ofmanufacturers to legitimate their products. However, the property of exhibiting
a large CRP space can also become a security threat. Recently, many PUF constructions have
faced model-based attacks to predict CRPs. We want to note that the terms weak and strong can
be misleading. There is no implication that weak PUFs offer a lower degree of security than
strong PUFs.
2.3.4 PUF-Specific Security Metrics
Various PUF security metrics have been defined by researchers in the community. Hori et al.
in [66] and Maiti et al. in [61] proposed PUF metrics to assess and compare the performance of
PUFs. For our evaluations, we utilize the security metrics uniqueness, reliability, bit aliasing,
and uniformity defined by Maiti et al. [61], which are widely used in literature.
Uniqueness – Inter Hamming Distance Measure
The PUF property uniqueness, as described in Section 2.3.1, is a measure of how uncorrelated
PUF responses are across different PUF instances using the same challenge. The corresponding
mathematical measure is referred to as inter hamming distance (inter-HD).
Definition 2.11. The inter hamming distance HDinter for two PUF instances 8 and 9 is:
HDinter = FHD('8, ' 9 ) (2.9)
where '8 and ' 9 are two responses from different PUF instances after applying the same
challenge.









FHD('8, ' 9 ) (2.10)
where 8 and 9 are two different PUF instances, each having !-bit responses '8 and ' 9 after
applying the same challenge.
Reliability – Intra Hamming Distance Measure
In Section 2.3.1, we have described the PUF property reproducibility as a measure of how equal
responses to the same challenge and PUF entity are. This means that the reproducibility is only
dependent on the impacts affecting a single PUF instance. The corresponding mathematical
measure is called intra hamming distance (intra-HD) which is the foundation for the reliability
metric.
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where '= describes the reference response and '′=,C is the C-th PUF response of a total of )
responses obtained from a repeatedly applied challenge.
The mean intra-HD value corresponds to the bit error. To obtain the reliability of the PUF
response generation, the `intra value (bit error) is subtracted from 1.









If single PUF response bits are strongly biased towards 0 or 1, different PUF instances produce
nearly identical responses. Similarly, this also reduces the entropy of the responses. Bit aliasing
can be caused by factors such as systematic process variations [67]. The bit aliasing metric is a
measure of the 0’s and 1’s distribution for each single bit position in responses generated from
# PUF instances for a fixed challenge.







where A=,; is the ;-th bit of a !-bit response of PUF instance =, obtained for a fixed challenge.
The ideal value is 0.5, which denotes that 0 and 1 are equally distributed at PUF response bit
position ;.
Uniformity
The uniformity metric is a measure of the balance of 0s and 1s in the response bits of a PUF.
Ideally, for truly random PUF responses the proportion between 0s and 1s should be equal.







where A=,; is the ;-th bit of a !-bit response. The ideal value is 0.5, which denotes that the
numbers of 0s and 1s are equal for PUF instance =.
2.3.5 PUF-Based Identification & Authentication
The terms identification and authentication have very broad meanings and therefore often lead
to confusion when not described in more detail. In general, identification refers to the identity
16
2.3 Physically Unclonable Functions – Concepts and Definitions
of a subject [68]. To clearly distinguish an object from others in a group, the identity must be
uniquely assigned. To give an example, on website logins usually the email address is used as
the user’s identity. Based on the email address, the website provider can determine whether an
account for the given user exists. On that note, the identity alone does not ensure that the user that
has entered the email address is the owner of the login account. At this point, the authentication
comes into play. Generally speaking, authentication proves that an identity is genuinely what it
claims to be or counterfeit [69].
In information security, it is usually distinguished between message authentication and entity
authentication [70]. The difference between both is thatmessage authentication does not include
any guarantee that proves when the message was created. In entity authentication, the verifying
party can prove the identity in real-time through actual communications [49]. In the following
discussions we focus on entity authentication, which is implied for PUF-based authentication.
In the literature, the terms identification and entity authentication are often used synonymously.
However, when we talk about identification we solely mean the identity of an object, whereas
with entity authentication we intend the legitimation of an object’s identity.
In electronic devices, identities are typically provisioned trough the assignment of identifiers
to a device. The provisioning party generates an unique identifier, mostly by using monotonic
counters or TRNGs. The identifiers must be stored permanently, which denotes an intrusion
from the provisioning party into the actual device. In contrast, PUFs can provide inherent
identities which connotes a practical advantage and brings a higher level of security. In [71],
O’Neill has shown that PUFs can provide both device identification and authentication, while
being tamper resistant. The process of generating inherent identities is called enrollment, which
implies that the identity is only read from the device but not written to it. On the downside,
inherent identities are completely out of control from the manufacturer. This can be an issue in
cases where the identity should carry additional information about the device, such as a serial
number that contains the device’s production date. Another specialty of inherent identities is
their fuzzy random behavior. In this context, the term fuzzy means that the identifiers are not
entirely uniformly distributed and not perfectly reproducible [43]. In PUFs, the identifiers or
responses are typically non-uniformly distributed and are subject to noise and environmental
impacts.
To perform identification and entity authenticationwith PUFs, the fuzziness of the PUF responses
must be determined. The intra-HD and inter-HD distributions describe the reproducibility and
uniqueness of the PUF responses, as already introduced in Section 2.3.4. Ideally, the intra-HD
would be zero, which means that the PUF responses can be reproduced reliably (without errors).
This would also mean that the responses are not fuzzy. The inter-HD is ideally at exactly 50 %
of the response bit width, which denotes uniformly random distributed responses. Although,
this does not correspond to the reality. To use inherent identities in practical applications, the
fuzziness has to be taken into account. During identification, the extracted PUF response is
compared with the identifier obtained in the enrollment phase by using the hamming distance
measure. In this context, we use the intra-HD and inter-HD distributions to show the coherence
between the reproducibility and uniqueness measures. Figure 2.4 shows the example intra-HD
and inter-HD distributions of a hypothetical PUF. Since the intra-HD is noticeably smaller than
the inter-HD, there is some degree of identifiability in the system. The overlap between both
distributions denotes fuzzy responses.
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Figure 2.4: Exemplary intra-HD and inter-HD distributions for a PUF-based identification system. The overlapping
region is split by the identification threshold into the false-acceptance-rate (FAR) and the false-rejection-
rate (FRR).
To achieve a high probability of true identifications, typically a so called identification threshold
value is used to distinguish between single entities and find matches. It is obvious that the
optimum threshold value must be set somewhere in the area of the overlapping region of the
intra-HD and inter-HD distributions. Thereby, the enclosed area is split into two sub-regions,
where the left one is denoted as the false-acceptance-rate (FAR), and the right one is the false-
rejection-rate (FRR). As a consequence, reducing the identification threshold also decreases the
FAR and increases the FRR, and vice versa. In general, the trade-off to find the optimumFAR and
FRR values is application-dependent. The FAR value is strongly related to security since false
acceptances denote mistaken identifications. This means that in cryptographic applications, the
FAR value ideally should be reduced to zero. On the other hand, the FRR value is connected with
the convenience of an identification system. Increased identification threshold values lead to less
false rejections. To sum up, we can say that the determination of an appropriate identification
threshold is a trade-off between security (low FAR) and convenience (low FRR). In practice, it
is often useful to minimize both values and therefore set the identification threshold to the point
where FAR=FRR,which is also referred to as the equal-error-rate (EER) [72]. The corresponding
equal-error-threshold value is denoted as thEER.
The exact values for FAR and FRR can be calculated by using the probability density functions
%intra(·) and %inter(·) of the intra-HD and inter-HD distributions, respectively.





where %inter(G) is the probability density function for the inter-HD distribution.
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where %intra(G) is the probability density function for the intra-HD distribution and ! is the PUF
response bit width.
We also want to note that the identifiability is strongly connected with the term ’easy to evaluate’
which belongs to the basic properties of PUFs.
2.4 Printed Electronics
2.4.1 Printed Electronics and Silicon Electronics
In the past decades, printed electronics (PE) has gained a lot of attraction by research groups
worldwide from academia and industries. PE promises to combine electronics manufacturing
with additive graphic printing. This enables new form factors, large-area structures, flexible
substrates, novel materials, and green or sustainable electronics [73]. Furthermore, PE benefits
from low-cost and on demand fabrication at point-of-use [74]. Potential applications can be
found in all market segments such as foldable displays [75] in consumer electronics, large-
area sensor networks [76] in the industry, batteries [77], energy harvesters [78], and adhesive
patches [79] in healthcare, to name but a few. In [73] Chang et. al review PE-based electronic
standard components.
Recent progress in nanomaterial science has brought metallic, organic, and inorganic nanoma-
terials and their processes to PE. The more degrees of freedom also enable to print on rough
substrates and under different angles, which makes PE technology also interesting for custom
wire traces and interconnects [80]. Compared to conventional silicon-based chip manufactu-
ring, different materials and processes can be used. Figure 2.5 compares the printing resolution
among various printing techniques and shows their operational areas. Gravure printing [81],
flexographic printing [82], screen printing [83], and nanoimprint lithography [84] belong to the
class of contact printing, whereas inkjet-printing is a non-contact printing technique [85].
The current trend of digitization demands more electronic systems than already used today.
Everyday objects will be equipped with some sort of intelligent electronics capable of commu-
nicating with other devices. In this regard, circuits must be thin, lightweight, and inexpensive.
This depicts the unique feature of PE in contrast to silicon technology. Table 2.1 compares PE and
conventional silicon-based electronics. The comparison clearly shows that both technologies are
complementary. Hence, it is not expected that PE will substitute silicon-based electronics [86].
Instead it will develop entirely new markets and industries by opening new opportunities for
high-volumne and low-cost printed circuits. On that note, new device architectures may com-
bine the advantages of both technologies, which is also referred to as hybrid systems. In the
subsequent section we focus on the inkjet-printing technology, which is widely used in research
and development.
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Figure 2.5: Printing resolution and high volume production capabilities for various printing techniques.
Table 2.1: Comparison of printed and conventional silicon-based (solid state) electronics.
Printed Electronics Silicon Electronics
Performance Low High
Design complexity Low High
Area per feature size High Low
Cost per unit area Low High
Device variations High Low
Throughput High Low
Substrate Flexible Rigid
Production site Decentralized Centralized
Lifetime Short Long
2.4.2 Inkjet-Printing Technology
Inkjet printing is a non-contact printing technology,where droplets of inks are precisely deposited
from a nozzle onto the printing substrate. The printing system is controlled directly by an image
processor that works on the basis of the digital print job format. Since inkjet-printing is entirely
digitally and electronically controlled, it is also referred to as digital printing. Inkjet-printers can
be classified either as continuous or drop-on-demand systems. The former provides a continuous
stream of ink drops during the printing process. In drop-on-demand systems, the ink droplets
are only generated if required. Nowadays, most of the commercially available inkjet-printers are
drop-on-demand printers based on piezoelectric, thermal, or electrostatic systems. Figure 2.6
shows the functional principle of a piezoelectric inkjet-printer nozzle. The piezoelectric ceramic










Figure 2.6: Schematic of the piezoelectric drop-on-demand inkjet-printing approach.
Inkjet-printers typically use liquid inks with low viscosity, which requires a further drying pro-
cess through evaporation and absorption. The advantages of inkjet-printing technology include
printing pattern adjustments and high quality prints on a variety of substrates. The major draw-
back is that the throughput is limited, even if using multiple print heads. For further information
on inkjet-printing please refer to [87, 88].
2.4.3 Organic vs. Inorganic Semiconductor Materials
Semiconducting materials which change their conductivity with operating conditions are the ba-
sis for active electronic devices. Organic semiconductors may be deposited by low temperature
and can be processed under less controlled environments than inorganic semiconductors, which
makes them attractive for low-cost lightweight electronics [73,89]. One of the major challenges
in organic semiconductors is the material’s instability to environmental conditions including
atmospheric oxygen, ambient humidity, and light [90]. On the other hand, inorganic semicon-
ductors show higher carrier-carrier mobilities, environmental stability, and superior electrical
properties such as low-voltage operation [91]. These features make inorganic semiconductor
materials suitable for higher performance electronic devices [92]. The low-voltage capabilities
make inorganic semiconductors interesting for hybrid systems, due to the direct compatibility
on the logic level of silicon and PE components.
To achieve a high lifetime of circuits incorporating active components, the materials and sol-
vents have to be compatible and the semiconductors must be encapsulated from environmental
impacts through additional passivation layers [88, 92–94]. A comprehensive introduction into
organic and inorganic materials as well as decapsulation techniques is given in [95].
2.4.4 Electrolyte-Gated Field-Effect Transistors
The electrolyte-gated field-effect transistor (EGT) is a n-type transistor with an inorganic high
intrinsic mobility semiconductor based on indium oxide (In2O3). Figure 2.7 shows the material
stack of the EGT. The transistor’s drain and source electrodes as well as the electric signal routing
layer consists of laser-ablated indium tin oxide (ITO). The insulator between the semiconductor
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and the top-gate electrode is realized with a composite solid polymer electrolyte (CSPE), which
provides a high gate capacitance. This allows for low voltage operation of the EGTs. The top-
gate electrode is based on PEDOT:PSS. The inorganic semiconductor material including the
electrolyte enables high performance at low supply voltages at ∼ 1 V. Further information on







Figure 2.7: Material stack of the electrolyte-gated field-effect transistor (EGT) (cf. [98]).
2.4.5 Security for Printed Devices and Systems
In times of the IoE, devices are typically interconnected and managed through networks or via
the Internet. One of the major challenges is therefore the exact identification of devices and
to secure communication when using compromised communication channels such as wireless
technology. Most of the conventional security solutions, such as asymmetric key establish-
ment methods [47, 48], are based on mathematically proven foundations. More specifically,
random numbers generated through software-based computational or hardware-based methods
are the basis for cryptography. One well-known example is the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) [19] that offers a high level of security.
Emerging technologies such as PE will further expand the IoE with new, especially lightweight
devices that are subject to strict design and performance constraints. Because of the differences
in fabrication and electrical characteristics between conventional silicon-based and PE tech-
nologies, existing security solutions cannot simply be adopted. In PE, particularly in digital
printing, there are two shortcomings that lead to increased variations. First, the limiting printing
resolution and second, the small quantities of materials in the form of nanoparticle-inks which
show sensitive interactions with the substrate.
In this respect, hardware-intrinsic security presents a very promising research field for providing
lightweight and high-quality security primitives. Furthermore, the PE’s drawback of exhibiting
high variations can be turned into a security feature when using the intrinsic variations as an
entropy source for random number generation. In this regard, PUFs are very promising to provi-
de security for PE-based devices and systems. Furthermore, also hybrid systems incorporating
silicon-based and PE components can benefit from the increased variations of the printed part.
At the same time, the decentralized manufacturing capabilities of PE technologies present a
root of trust compared to foundry-fabricated fully silicon systems. In this context, PE offers to
fabricate the printed circuits in-house, which pushes the concept of ’root of trust’ to a higher
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level. If the device is powered off, no secret key can be found in any memory, which means that
the root key is invisible.
In general, PE technology brings new security needs, constraints, risks and implications which
need to be elaborated. Very recently, several researchers proposed first approaches for printed
PUFs. Often it is not straightforward to clearly distinguish between printed PUFs and PUFs
just based on novel materials. In Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 we review and classify a selection of
existing PUFs. In some cases, the crucial factor for a PUF to belong to the class of printed PUFs
is the fabrication process. On that note, we assign PUFs that are based on novel materials but
not printed to the class of novel material PUFs.
2.5 State of the Art of PUFs
2.5.1 Silicon-Based PUFs
This section gives an overview about different state of the art PUF types in silicon technology. At
this point, we further distinguish between electrical PUFs and optical PUFs. The reason behind
can be found in the evaluation complexity. While electrical PUFs leverage the unique electrical
characteristics of integrated and compact hardware circuits to generate responses, optical PUFs
use complex mechanisms to sense the surface of materials and objects. If we remember the PUF
definition from Section 2.3.1, the attribute ’easy to evaluate’ only holds true for electrical PUFs
due to their integration capabilities and technology compatibility. Analog PUFs, arbiter PUFs,
ring oscillator PUFs (RO-PUFs), memory-based PUFs, and coating PUFs belong to the class of
electrical PUFs.
Analog PUFs
PUF designs that capture the variations as analog information are also referred to as analog
PUFs [99]. Lofstrom et al. [100] introduced the integrated circuit identification (ICID) approach
to generate unique and unclonable identifiers based on the intrinsic process variations of the
silicon. This is the first implementation of an electrical PUF referring to intrinsic fingerprint
extraction and unclonable identifiers. Saha et al. [101] proposed the threshold voltage PUF
(TV-PUF), which is an advancement of the ICID approach. To magnify the impact of MOSFET
threshold voltage variations, they use cascaded NMOS transistors in series. Vijayakumar et
al. [99] investigated non-linear voltage transfer characteristics (NLVTC-PUF) to provide secure
PUF authentication.
Arbiter PUFs
Arbiter PUFs are based on delay paths that are activated simultaneously. The response is
decided on which path was dominating by having a faster signal propagation. Usually, the delay
paths consist of numerous multiplexers that can be configured by an external challenge. The
advantage of arbiter PUFs is that they have direct challenge and response interfaces without
the need for a further evaluation logic. Lee et al. [102] and Lim et al. [103] proposed the first
arbiter PUFs to build secret keys for identification and authentication applications, as shown
in Figure 2.8. Typically, arbiter PUFs are used as strong PUFs where the CRPs are not further
obfuscated and are publicly available. In various works, researchers have successfully attacked
and modeled arbiter PUFs through machine learning attacks [104, 105]. As a countermeasure,
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several variants of the arbiter PUF have been proposed to introduce additional non-linearity
to provide more resistance [106, 107]. Nonetheless, also these variants have been successfully
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Figure 2.8: Basic #-stage arbiter PUF architecture.
Ring Oscillator PUFs
A ring oscillator (RO) is a chain with odd numbers of inverting logic elements. The output signal
of the last inverter stage is fed back to the first element. As a consequence, the RO oscillates with
a specific frequency that is variation-dependent. Suh et al. [110] introduced the first RO-PUF
design, as shown in Figure 2.9. The RO-PUF consists of an array of identical ROs which can
be arbitrarily addressed in pairs. Based on the challenge, the outputs of the addressed ROs are
multiplexed to two counters to measure the oscillation frequencies. Based on which frequency
was higher, a single response bit with the binary value 0 or 1 is generated.
RO-PUFs consist of standard logic elements that can be easily implemented in field programm-
able gate arrays (FPGAs), which is one of the main advantages. Since the CRP space of the
architecture scales polynomially, RO-PUFs are weak PUFs. Nonetheless, many implementations
target to extract low to medium numbers of keys [111–113], which makes it also interesting for
















Figure 2.9: Basic RO-PUF architecture with # ring oscillators.
Memory-Based PUFs
Memory-based PUFs are based on the undefined power-up state of cross-coupled inverter cells.
The first memory-based PUF using SRAM cells was introduced by Guarjardo et al. [115] to
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protect the intellectual property (IP) in FPGAs. Figure 2.10a shows the logical circuit of an
SRAM cell. SRAM-PUFs [116] and butterfly PUFs [117] are the most widespread memory-
based PUFs that can be found in literature and are also referred to as bistable PUFs. Butterfly
PUFs are based on latch logic gates, as shown in Figure 2.10b. In memory-based PUFs, the
challenge is the powering up of the supply voltage. The advantages of memory-based PUFs
are that the response is directly available in the memory and that standard cells can be used
to implement them into FPGAs. At this point we want to note that many FPGAs perform
startup memory initialization when powering up the device, which hinders to implement PUF









Figure 2.10: Basic logical circuits of (a) an SRAM cell and (b) a latch.
Coating PUFs
Coating PUFs have a layer wrapped around the integrated circuit or printed circuit board. Tuyls
et al. [121] introduced the first coating PUF based on local variations in capacitances. The
response is generated based on measurements of the unique pattern of the capacitances. The
advantage of coating PUFs is that touching the security primitive can change the responses. This
can be used to guarantee tamper-evidence. However, coating PUFs are relatively complex and
therefore not often used.
Optical PUFs
Optical PUFs exploit imperfect speckle patterns as an entropy source to generate unique identi-
fiers. The first optical PUF was proposed by Pappu et al. [122]. A challenge mainly comprises
laser coordinates and angles to inspect the object carrying the variations to be evaluated. The
advantage of optical PUFs is that no circuitry is required on the PUF-carrying object [65].
However, this research did not really proceed because of the many drawbacks that come with
the optical inspections needed for PUF response generation. In the most cases, high-cost equip-
ment such as microscopes, image processing, and optical readout for reliable key generation are
required, which is disadvantageous for high-volume applications.
2.5.2 Printed PUFs
Printed PUFs is a very young research field in the scope of hardware-intrinsic security. Currently,
there are two electrical PUFs based on memory cells and one optical PUF design that can be
found in the literature.
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Memory-Based PUFs
Guerin et al. [123] have designed and fabricated an all-organic sheet-to-sheet processed RFID
tag incorporating an SRAM-PUF structure with four output bits. The PUF is used to generate
random identification numbers for the RFID tags. No performance measures have been carried
out in this work. Typically for organic PE, the supply voltage of 20 V is relatively high. For the
special case of RFID technology, the increased supply voltage is no obstacle, since RFID tags
are often powered by the reader device.
In another work, Erozan et al. [124, 125] have designed, fabricated, and evaluated an inkjet-
printed memory-based PUF. The design is based on inorganic EGTs and shows good results
regarding the uniqueness and reliability metrics. The advantage of this PUF implementation
is that it can operate at supply voltages as low as 0.5 V. This makes the memory-based PUF
suitable the integration into IoT devices and for lightweight authentication.
Optical PUFs
Liu et al. [126] have presented inkjet-printed anti-counterfeiting labels based on quantum dot
fluorescent materials. For the PUF authentication, a (portable) microscope and artificial intelli-
gence (AI) are required. The proposed security labels target applications where a line of sight
between the label-equipped object and the authenticating device does exist.
2.5.3 Novel Material PUFs
Very recently, researchers have proposed PUF designs based on novel materials. The initial
motivation for novel security primitives originates from the desire to achieve more secure,
robust, and lightweight PUF designs. Novel materials offer unique properties such as substantial
process variations, small footprints,multi-level bits capability ofmemory cells, reconfigurability,
and lower energy consumption [127].
Carbon Nanotube PUFs
Konigsmark et al. [128] have presented the carbon nanotube PUF (CNPUF) based on carbon
nanotube field-effect transistor (CNFET) characteristics. The advantages of the CNPUF include
higher reliability against environmental variations and increased resistance against modeling
attacks. Furthermore, they achieved a lower energy consumption compared to low-power silicon-
based PUF designs. In [129] Hu et al. presented another PUF based on carbon nanotubes. In
their work, they exploit the connection yield and switching behavior of carbon nanotube devices
in an array structure to achieve a ternary-bit architecture. The ternary-bit logic strengthens the
security capabilities of the PUF.
Memory-Based PUFs
Another promising research direction is the phase change memory PUF (PCM-PUF) utilizing
the crystalline and amorphous nature of phase change materials [127]. The advantage of PCM
is that each cell has the ability to store multiple bits. For response generation, the resistance of
the PCM cells is measured and evaluated. Kursawe et al. [130] proposed the first PUF based on
PCM cells, called reconfigurable PUF (rPUF). The advantage of their approach is that the phase
change mechanism can be used to transform an rPUF into a new PUF with new unpredictable
CRPs.
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Memristor PUFs
In the past decade, memristors gained a lot of attraction in the research community. Several
research groups have presented memristor PUFs (M-PUFs) as variants of memory-based
PUFs [131–134]. The reconfigurability and reduction of area size compared to silicon-based
electronics belongs to the main advantages.
Ring Oscillator PUFs
Kuribara et al. [135] have proposed an organic RO-PUF to generate unique identifiers. The ROs
were fabricated using thermal evaporation and solution processes. At this point we want to note
that their work does not include peripheral logic circuitry such as multiplexers and frequency
counters. Although the RO-PUF offers the potential of being fabricated with PE technology, we
categorize it into the novel materials section since it was not printed.
Optical PUFs
Optical PUFs face major drawbacks concerning the integration capabilities into electronic de-
vices. Nonetheless, in the past years various optical PUF designs based on novel materials have
been proposed. The reason for this development is that novel materials offer new possibilities to
break the limitations of conventional technologies. In the literature, novel optical PUF designs
can be found based on volumetric physical storage [136], randomly distributed nanowires [137],
plasmonic nanoparticles [138], imaging of excitation-selected lanthanide luminescence [139],
multi-mode optical waveguide [140], and biological human T-cells [141]. The advantages of
these optical PUFs are mainly the huge CRP spaces (strong PUFs) and the tamper-evidence.
2.5.4 PUF Applications & Available Commercial Products
From the application perspective, weak PUFs are normally used in device identification, crypto-
graphic key generation and storage, as well as IP protection. In the special case of cryptography,
PUFs do not require expensive cryptographic hardware such as the secure hash algorithm (SHA)
or public/private key encryption algorithms to generate secure keys [55]. On the other hand and
due to the exponential CRP space, strong PUFs are mainly used for low-cost authentication,
where each CRP is only used once in the lifetime of the PUF [142]. Figure 2.11 visualizes the
device authentication scenario including a PUF. A comprehensive overview on cryptographic
protocols including authentication can be found in [143].
PUFs can already be found in various commercially available products. This shows that the field
of hardware-intrinsic security is not only attractive for academia but rather inspires engineers to
bring this technology into products.
A product review regarding PUFs in commercial products shows that FPGA and system on a
chip (SoC) manufacturers started to integrate PUFs into their boards natively. Examples include
the Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ FPGA devices [144] with a built-in PUF to derive strong and
device-unique cryptographic keys. The Intel Stratix 10 FPGA/SoC platform [145] includes a
PUF for key protection and hardware identity. The Microsemi Corporation integrated a PUF
into their SmartFusion2 FPGA/SoC platform [146] to implement advanced security functions
based on unique device biometrics. NXP integrates a PUF into the LPC54S0xx microcontroller
family [147] to generate, store, and reconstruct keys.
The company Intrinsic ID, Inc. (USA) offers PUF-based unclonable identities for IoT devices.
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Figure 2.11: The mechanism of PUF authentication.
Their product portfolio mainly consists of memory-based PUFs, particularly SRAM-PUFs and
butterfly PUFs, used to provide hardware-based root of trust. The products are available as the so
called QuiddiKey hardware IP for direct integration into ICs as well as in the form of the Monark
FPGA IP. Another company called PHYSEC GmbH (Germany) offers security solutions for the
IoT including the Enclosure-PUF for tamper proof.
A patent review has shown that various semiconductor companies filed patents on PUFs in the
past decade. This indicates a strong commercial interest in PUFs, which is mainly driven by
providing secure device authentication. Table 2.2 shows a selection of patents.
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2.6 Security Threats
2.6.1 Security Threats for PE-Based Devices and Systems
In times of digitization and the IoE, electronic devices have become pervasive in our everyday
life. This implicates that interconnected systems are embedded into our environment, with
the aim to increase productivity to add value, to reduce cost, and to make our everyday life
easier. However, the many advantages also bring vast security threats. The risks start at the
manufacturing process of electronic devices, over often missing subsequent patching and update
capabilities, physical security, while also affecting privacy and confidentiality issues as well
as lack of user awareness and knowledge. In the IoE, all kind of data is exchanged through
often compromised local and wide area networks, such as sensor networks and the Internet.
In the past decades, information security, more specifically cryptography has further improved
to authenticate devices, secure communication in the presence of third parties, and ensure
data integrity. Most cryptographic systems are based on symmetric- (e.g. Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) [19]) or asymmetric-key (e.g. Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange [47, 48])
algorithms. Various works can be found dealing with the security of symmetric- and asymmetric
cryptography [156–158]. In general, cryptography is based on secret keys that are mainly
generated through computational one-way functions or RNGs. The main drawback of these
approaches is that the secret keys need to be stored in the devices. Basically, this is comparable
to the root of trust issue that we have already discussed in Section 2.2.2. In NVMs it is also
possible to reveal the memory contents when powered off, which makes them vulnerable against
reverse-engineering attacks. In literature this is also referred to as memory leakage [63].
Under the assumption that many lightweight IoE devices will be available in the near future, the
investigation of security models becomes a vital factor. Since the requirements of conventional
cryptography solutions in terms of computation performance are often hard to met in lightweight
devices, we mainly concentrate on hardware-intrinsic security primitives. In general, in terms of
security threats we distinguish between two classes. The first class is the provision of information,
which includes non-invasive-, semi-invasive-, and invasive attacks. In security models, these
attacks are used to reveal secrets from a device. We use the overall term eavesdropping for
these techniques. The second class of threats is the learning or cloning, which can either be
model-based or physical cloning of the device properties. It should be noted that eavesdropping
is the basis for learning and cloning. PUFs store secrets in a non-volatile manner, but in contrast
to NVMs, the secret key is only available in binary form once needed. Moreover, the source
of uniqueness in PUFs is very hard to observe without altering or even destroying the PUF.
However, invasive attacks are often not reasonable since expensive equipment is needed and the
original PUF circuit will be destroyed. Figure 2.12 visualizes the general procedure for cloning
PUFs.
In the next sections we focus on eavesdropping and model-based attacks, which are widely used






























Figure 2.12: Procedure of eavesdropping and cloning PUFs.
2.6.2 Eavesdropping Attacks
In the scope of PUFs, eavesdropping describes the provision of information, particularly of
CRPs. Thereby, attackers might eavesdrop either the operations between the PUF and the sur-
rounding circuitry or the communication channels between PUF-equipped devices. Depending
on the security-level, the responses of strong PUFs are often utilized as single-use keys which are
discarded after usage. On the first sight this enables a high security-level in bilateral communica-
tion. One possible application scenario would be device authentication, where the manufacturer
extracts CRPs after production and stores them in a database. For authentication, the manufac-
turer transmits one of the challenges to the PUF, which replies with its response. Since the CRP
is only used once, the data transmission has not to be encrypted, which makes it easy to properly
authenticate lightweight devices. However, if there are dependencies between the PUF CRPs, an

































Figure 2.13: Overview on eavesdropping attacks.
In general, eavesdropping techniques are classified into non-invasive, semi-invasive, and inva-
sive attacks. Figure 2.13 classifies the available attacks in a trade-off between security and
the attacker’s effort. Non-invasive attacks are per definition neither disrupting the operati-
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on of the affected device, nor do they damage the internal physical structure [159]. Widely
used non-invasive techniques include side-channel analysis [160–162] based on communicati-
on protocol sniffing [163], power analysis [164, 165], electromagnetic interference-based fault
injection [159], and fault attacks [166]. The benefits of these attacks are that in the case of
eavesdropping the communication protocol, no direct physical access to the device is required.
Furthermore, low-cost equipment is sufficient and non-invasive attacks leave no evidence that
an attack has happened.
In contrast, invasive attacks physically break into a device and therebymodify its internal structu-
re. For example, Helfmeier et al. [119] have successfully attacked an SRAM-PUF and produced
a physical clone of it. For the characterization of the PUF they used invasive decapsulation in
conjunction with microprobing. This process is also called reverse-engineering. High-precision
and high-cost equipment is needed to expose the layers of the internal PUF circuit and measure
its characteristics, which also implies physical access to the device. In many cases, non-invasive
attacks are inappropriate and invasive attacks are too expensive. As a further security threat,
in [167] Skorobogatov has introduced semi-invasive attacks. Thereby, depackaging of the of-
fended chip is necessary, but no electrical contact to the internal wirings is required. Typical
attacks are based on electromagnetic (EM) [168–170] and optical analysis [119]. The benefits
of this technique are that the functionality of the original device is not affected and that low-cost
is possible. However, the attacker must gain physical access to the device.
If all CRPs of a PUF were eavesdropped, the adversary is able to create a physical clone. Howe-
ver, most often it is impossible to eavesdrop all CRPs, particularly if the number of PUF CRPs
is high. Typically, just a small subset of the actual CRP space is used in practice. Especially if
the attacker is limited to passive eavesdropping and cannot control the challenges actively. In
this case, one possible solution is to find interdependencies between the revealed CRPs, e.g. by
using model-based attacks, which is explained in the next section.
2.6.3 Model-Based Attacks
Model-based attacks attempt to estimate the unknown model parameters as a function of the
observed CRPs [43]. It is required that a subset of CRPs has already been eavesdropped from
a specific PUF entity. In the past years, various model-based attacks on PUF designs have
been proposed by researchers to break with security. Given a subset of CRPs from a PUF, the
goal is to find a model in the form of an algorithm which behaves indistinguishably from the
original PUF [114]. The most commonly used attacks are based on machine learning (ML)
techniques. In general, ML is a very powerful tool to create and improve a model based on
training data and make predictions or decisions. In this context, the term modeling attacks
is widely used to describe methods based on mathematical or numerical PUF models using
optimization algorithms. Please note that we use the more general term model-based attacks,
since the attacks must not necessarily be based onML techniques. For example in Section 6.4, we
show that for some PUF types sorting attacks can be a good alternative. Furthermore, methods
based on linear programming [103,171,172] have been proposed by researchers to model PUFs.
Originally, model-based attacks were introduced for strong PUF implementations with a huge
CRP space, which in many cases offer a publicly accessible challenge-response interface. On the
other hand, weak PUFs can produce only a small number of CRPs and are typically embedded
into a controlled environment. However, weak PUFs may also provide hundreds or thousands of
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CRPs, which raises the threats emanating from model-based attacks as well.
Different PUF types have individual vulnerabilities against model-based attacks. For example
in arbiter PUFs, each challenge involves all stages which means that each response carries
information about the entire PUF’s delay behavior for that special configuration. This allows
to describe the functionality of arbiter PUFs with a linear delay model [103, 172, 173]. On the
other hand, the challenges of analog PUFs and RO-PUFs typically include just a subset of the
arbitrarily addressable cells, i.e. MOSTFETs or ring oscillators. In this case, the adversary has
to eavesdrop more CRPs to draw conclusions about the internal PUF characteristics.
Another important measure to assess the vulnerabilities of PUFs against model-based attacks is
the entropy analysis. The entropy of a PUF is a measure of the statistical independency of its
CRPs. If a PUF exhibits a low entropy score, this can be seen as an indicator that model-based
attacks can break the PUF. At the same time, achieving a high entropy score does not necessarily
imply immunity. This means that the security of a PUF is not solely dependent on the entropy
but rather the internal functionality plays a major role. Furthermore, if the 0s and 1s are unevenly
distributed over the PUF responses, in other words if the PUF responses are biased, an attacker
can guess others with a higher probability. In conclusion, PUF clones can impersonate original
PUFs, which holds true for model-based and physical clones. However, model-based clones can
be arbitrarily duplicated and distributed with low effort and at low cost.
If we remember the unclonability property of PUFs from Section 2.3.1, we have bound unpredic-
tability with mathematical unclonability. The circumstance that PUFs are provably vulnerable
against model-based attacks is a further indication that the wording physically unclonable func-
tion is more suitable than physical unclonable function.
2.6.4 Machine Learning-Based Attacks
Machine learning is used in a wide range of applications, where it is difficult to describe a spe-
cific functionality by using conventional algorithms. The application fields include image [174]
and speech recognition [175], medical diagnosis [176], email spam filtering [177], product re-
commendations [178], traffic prediction [179], to name but a few. In the ML context, the term
learning involves the representation, evaluation, and optimization [180]. The representation is
the ML algorithm that describes the behavior to be modeled in a formal language. In the next
step, the evaluation is needed to assess and distinguish between ML models. Finally, the opti-
mization is the basis for the learning capability and determines its efficiency. Typically, machine
learning algorithms are classified into supervised learning [181], unsupervised learning [182],
and reinforcement learning [183]. Figure 2.14 shows the ML classes and a selection of ML
algorithms. More detailed information on ML algorithms can be found in [184].
In this work, we focus on the most widely usedML technique: classification. In [180], Domingos
et al. present an overview on available ML classifiers. In general, an ML classifier is a function
that takes input data in the form of a feature vector, also referred to as training data, and outputs
the class it belongs to. Classification is a supervised learning technique, where the training data
comprises the feature vectors (inputs) and the corresponding observations (outputs). Typically,
ML classifiers are trained through optimization based on error minimization. In the following,
we will concentrate on logistic regression (LR) [185], random forest (RF), and perceptron-based
ML algorithms.
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Figure 2.14: Machine learning classes and selection of algorithms.
Logistic Regression
LR belongs to the class of supervised learning algorithms. Technically speaking, it is not a
ML classifier, but it can be used for binary classification by choosing a decision value that
separates between the two classes. Therefore, the term logistic regression classifier is often used
in literature. In general, an LR classifier takes an input vector ®x and assigns it to the discrete
class C2, which is also referred to as categorical data with two values. The core cost/activation
function is the so-called logistic function, more particularly the sigmoid function 5f (I).
Definition 2.19. The sigmoid function is defined as:
5f (I) =
1
1 + 4−I . (2.17)
The hypothesis function ℎ\ (®x) = 5f ( ®\)®x) limits the cost function to binary values between
0 and 1. The transposed vector ®\) denotes the regression coefficients (weights) adjusted by
the optimizer algorithm to find suitable decision boundaries for the classifier. In the context
of PUFs, LR is one of the most often used ML algorithm to model the challenge-response
behavior [104, 114, 186].
Random Forest
RF is an unsupervised learning algorithm based on decision trees. A decision tree is a directed
graph, where each path splits into branches following the decision rules to map the desired
behavior. Figure 2.15 shows a sample decision tree. The appearance of a decision tree depends
on the training data that determines the decision rules and the order of the branches. This means
that single decision trees might perform worse. However, the RF technique overcomes this
issue. It assumes that a crowd of randomly created decision trees can achieve better matching






Yes No Yes NoYes
Sunny Rainy
Normal High Weak Strong
Figure 2.15: Sample decision tree for playing tennis on weather conditions (cf. [187]).
RF is mainly used for classification and regression tasks. In general, the RF classifier is an
ensemble of individual decision trees, each making a class prediction. Finally, majority voting
is used to determine the overall class prediction of the RF classifier. One of the main advantages
of the RF classifier is its efficiency on large data sets. In the context of PUF modeling attacks,
various PUF designs have been attacked by the RF algorithm [188–190].
Perceptron-Based Learning
Perceptron-based learning algorithms belong to the class of supervised learning. Figure 2.16a
visualizes the perceptron as proposed by Minsky et al. in [191] as well as the artificial neuron as
firstly introduced byMcCulloch et al. in [192], which are the fundamental units of artificial neural
networks (ANNs). The difference between both is the activation function. While perceptrons
utilize the step function as the activation function to distinguish between two classes at the
output, artificial neurons typically make use of smoother variants. The most commonly used
activation function is the sigmoid function (see Definition 2.17), which is a special case of the
logistic function. Figure 2.16b shows the step and sigmoid functions for a given bias F0.
In the ML context, it is distinguished between single-layer perceptrons (SLPs) and multi-layer
perceptrons (MLPs). SLPs are classifiers that are limited to learning linear separable patterns.
The so-called activation potential of a neuron is denoted as I =
∑=
8=1 F8 · G8 + F0, where F8 are
the weights, G8 are the input values, and F0 is the bias. According to the step function, the
classification is set to 1 (true) if the sum I exceeds the decision threshold value, and 0 (false)
otherwise. SLPs can comprise an arbitrary number of perceptrons, where all are arranged in a
single-layer architecture.
MLPs are finite directed acyclic graphs that include at least one additional hidden layer between
the input and the output layers, as shown in Figure 2.17. Typically, artificial neurons based on
non-linear activation functions are used.
Definition 2.20. The mathematical description of an artificial neuron is:




F8 · G8 + F0
)
(2.18)
where 5act(·) is the activation function, ®x = (G1, . . . , G=) is the input vector with = values,
®w = (F1, . . . , F=) is the weight vector, and F0 is the bias.
The input values ®x pass through the first layer whose outputs are the inputs of the subsequent
layer. This repeats until the output layer is reached. Adding more hidden layers allows to learn
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Figure 2.16: (a) Visualization of a perceptron with the input feature vector ®x = {G1, . . . , G=} and the weight vector
®w = {F1, . . . , F=} with the bias F0. Perceptrons use the step activation function, whereas artificial
neurons typically use smoother functions such as the sigmoid. (b) Step and sigmoid activation functions.
more complex patterns, which is also referred to as deep learning. The learning capability comes
from the backpropagation algorithm that recalculates the weights vector ®w based on error or loss
minimization from back to front of the network. To perform backpropagation, the error function
must be differentiable in order to calculate the gradients. More detailed information on error
functions and backpropagation can be found in [193,194]. For more details on perceptron-based



















Figure 2.17: Multi-layer perceptron architecture.
Perceptron-based learning algorithms in the form of SLPs and MLPs are widely used to model
PUFs [196–200]. The main advantage of perceptron-based attacks is that ANNs can learn
complex patterns and non-linear correlations. The broad applicability makes them a good choice
independent from the actual PUF type.
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2.6.5 Machine Learning Metrics
In general, machine learning techniques can be versatile with manifold application fields. A
variety of machine learning metrics have been proposed for different machine learning models
such as classification metrics [201], regression metrics [202], ranking metrics [203], to name
but a few. In this work we focus on classification metrics, since our ML attacks on PUFs are
based on ML classifiers.
Confusion Matrix
The basic concept to assess the classification performance is the so-called confusion matrix. The
confusion matrix is a tabular comparison between a model’s ground truth labels (the actual class)
and the predictions. Figure 2.18 shows an exemplary confusion matrix for a binary classifier
(two classes).
True positives (TP) False negatives (FN)
False positives (FP) True negatives (TN)
Predicted class







Figure 2.18: Confusion matrix for a binary classifier [204].
The predictions are classified into true positives (TP), false positives (FP), true negatives (TN),
and false negatives (FN). These confusion matrix values are the basis for other types of classifi-
cation metrics.
True positives (TP): The actual class is positive and the predicted class was also positive.
False positives (FP): The actual class is positive, but the prediction was negative.
True negatives (TN): The actual class is negative and the predicted class was also negative.
False negatives (FN): The actual class is negative, but the predicted class was positive.
Classification Accuracy
The classification accuracy is an intuitive performance measure considering correct predictions
in relation to the total number of predictions made. In literature the terms prediction accuracy
and accuracy are widely used.
Definition 2.21. The classification accuracy is:
Classification accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN (2.19)
where TP are the true positives, FP are the false positives, TN are the true negatives, and FN
are the false negatives, respectively.
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Area Under Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve
The area under receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC) is widely used to assess binary
classifications. The shortened term area under curve (AUC) can be found very often in literature,
which is in our opinion bad practice. AUC could mean any curve, whereas AUROC uniquely
defines that the area under a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is meant.
In binary classifications, the classifier boundary to distinguish between classes is determined
by a threshold value. According to the previously shown confusion matrix, a binary classifier
always has four possible outcomes (TP, TN, FP, FN). The ROC curve is used to determine the
ideal threshold value for the classifier. This is done by a trade-off between the ratio of actual
positive classes that were correctly predicted as positive and the ratio of actual negative classes
that were mistakenly predicted as positive. The former is referred to as the true-positive-rate
(TPR), whereas the latter denotes the false-positive-rate (FPR), respectively.
Definition 2.22. The true-positive-rate (TPR), also called sensitivity, describes the probability
of detection and is defined as:
TPR =
TP
TP + FN (2.20)
where TP are the true positives and FN are the false negatives, respectively.
Definition 2.23. The false-positive-rate (TPR), also called specificity, is also known as proba-
bility of false alarm and is defined as:
FPR =
FP
FP + TN (2.21)
where TN are the true negatives and FP are the false positives, respectively.






















Figure 2.19: Sample receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve and area under ROC (AUROC).
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The ROC curve is a plot showing the TPR against the FPR for various threshold values.
Figure 2.19 shows a sample ROC curve (blue line) and the corresponding AUROC. The upper
left black point denotes a perfect classification, where the TPR is 1 and the FPR is 0. The dashed
black line indicates a random guess with equal TPR and FPR values. If the bending of the ROC
curve is steady, the TPR and FPR values are uniformly distributed. In the machine learning
community ROC curves are often used for model comparison.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced the basic concepts of security in general and hardware-
intrinsic security in particular, aswell as studied state of the art PUFs. Furthermore,we elaborated
on the differences between PE and silicon electronics, inkjet-printed inorganic transistors, and
the need for lightweight security solutions for PE-based electronic devices and systems. Finally,
we have explored potential security threats existing for PUFs.
The presented overview provides all the information necessary to understand the subsequent
chapters and therefore serves as a convenient reference work. We have also introduced the
mathematical foundations in the form of security and performance metrics to assess the qualities
of the PUF constructions and to compare them with related works.
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3 PUF Design & Fabrication
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we have discussed the significance of security in the digitized world.
For the time being, the research field of hardware-intrinsic security primitives based on novel
materials is in the early stages. Since PE is a key driver for the IoE, the demand for lightweight
security solutions is expected to be enormous in the future. Inmany application scenarios, such as
printed large-area sensors, printed antennas in communication devices, etc., PE technology goes
hand in hand with conventional silicon-based electronics. In this manner, the unique features
of two worlds can be combined in a single operating device. Most of the novel material PUFs
belong to the class of optical PUFs that require complex evaluation systems. This strictly limits
the applicability for lightweight devices and systems, as emerging from PE technology in the
scope of the IoE. In the past years, first printed electrical PUFs have been proposed in literature,
showing promising performance in terms of the PUF security metrics. The better integration
capabilities of electrical PUFs, compared to optical PUFs, make them promising candidates as
lightweight security primitives. In this context, the additive manufacturing processes used in PE
lead to larger device variations compared to lithographically structured devices. The source of
variations reaches from discrete droplet size of the printed ink, the surface roughness of printed
layers, the quality of the interfaces between the layers in general, up to scaling errors in the
channel width-to-length ratio of printed transistors, to name but a few [26–31]. In this chapter
we aim to:
• Present the fundamentals of the Differential Circuit PUF (DiffC-PUF) including the design
rationale, requirements, as well as the challenge and response generation.
• Give detailed insights into the implementation architecture of the DiffC-PUF as an embed-
ded system. This also includes the hardware design and fabrication of the PUF as a fully
silicon system and as a hybrid PUF incorporating silicon-based and printed components.
• Present the high-level software architecture by describing the components and parameters
being involved into the PUF response generation mechanism.
3.2 PUF Design
3.2.1 Design Rationale & Requirements
The rationale behind PUF designs is a trade-off between many different factors. In the following,
we present six quality parameters to determine the essential requirements on PUFs for a specific
application scenario. The quality parameters include the security level, tamper evidence, simpli-
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city, scalability, cost effectiveness, and integrability. Figure 3.1 visualizes the quality parameters,
each being ranked by low, medium, or high. The shaded surface shows the ranking carried out
in the decision phase for a PUF based on PE technology.
Figure 3.1: Radar chart of the PUF quality parameters. The ranking indicated by the shaded surface shows the
requirements selected for a PE-based PUF.
Table 3.1 shows the PUF qualities and a list of possible rankings. In general, the security level
refers to the security capabilities of different PUF constructions. In the context of lightweight
PE-based security primitives, cryptographic applications are too complex for the time being.
Therefore, the target security level is set to medium, which enables device authentication. Please
note that a medium security level does not directly imply that authentication is less secure
than cryptography. In contrast to authentication, cryptographic keys must satisfy more strict
requirements in terms of entropy, uniformity, etc. and are the basis for authentication protocols.
As initially discussed in Section 2.3.1, tamper evidence is hard to achieve with electronic PUFs
and often not required. For that reason it is set to low. Simplicity relates to the circuit and
key derivation complexity of PUFs. In general, this quality parameter refers to the Kerckhoffs’s
principlewhich states that security should not only come from ’security through obscurity’ [205].
In other words: ’The simpler the secrets that one must keep to ensure system security, the easier it
is to maintain system security’ [206]. For example, memory-based PUFs exhibit high simplicity,
since the challenge complexity is limited to the powering-up state of the memory cells and
the response is directly accessible in binary form. However, the simplicity is set to medium to
obtain an additional degree of freedom that comes with the challenge addressing capability,
which enables non-linear scaling of the CRP space. The scalability is well defined by the weak
and strong PUF classifications (please refer to Section 2.3.3 for more details). Weak PUFs with
very low numbers of responses are also referred to as POKs. Strong PUFs typically comprise a
large number of complex circuit components, which detracts the suitability for PE technology.
Therefore, the scalability requirement is set to medium. Finally, the cost effectiveness and
integrability qualities are set to high. This is a consequence of the unique properties originating
from PE technology such as mass production, customizability, and on demand fabrication. The
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ranking of these two qualities are in contrast to silicon PUFs, which often suffer from high
integration and fabrication costs.
Table 3.1: PUF qualities and possible rankings. Please note that the list is not comprehensive.
Low Medium High
Security level Identification Authentication Cryptography





Simplicity High complexity Medium complexity Low complexity
Scalability POK Weak PUF Strong PUF
Cost effectiveness High cost Medium cost Low cost
Integrability Redesign required PUF can be integratedinto existing designs
PUF reuses existing
circuitry
Since PE technology faces limitations in terms of circuit complexity and performance, it is chal-
lenging to construct a PUF design offering a large CRP space. Nonetheless, many applications
require either large key bit widths, or the opportunity to generate a number of different keys. One
typical example for the former case is device identification, where a larger bit width of the iden-
tifier (key) typically leads to a larger number of devices that can be uniquely distinguished. One
possible solution is to use memory-based PUFs, e.g. as introduced by Guerin et al. in [123] and
Erozan et al. in [124,125]. However, the drawback of memory-based PUFs is their linear scaling
of the CRP space, which causes high area consumption, if using PE technology to achieve large
key bit widths. In identification tasks, the main requirement to be achieved is that the generated
keys must be unique and reproducible, while other security measures such as uniformity are
of lower priority. This means that key derivation techniques become applicable that provide
non-linear bit width scaling, as long as the uniqueness of the resulting key is sufficient to meet
the application requirements. If targeting authentication and cryptographic key generation tasks,
it is often required to generate several security keys. For example in PUF-based authentication
protocols it is often intended to utilize single-use CRPs in order to uniquely authenticate devices.
This also applies to cryptographic key generation, where various keys might be required, e.g.
for encryption and decryption of data.
The herein derived requirements for PE-based PUFs as determined above are based on the
assumption, that as many target applications as possible can be targeted by the resulting PUF
construction. Referring to the RO-PUF construction as introduced by Suh et al. in [110], in
the next section we introduce the Differential Circuit PUF (DiffC-PUF) design. The aim of the
DiffC-PUF construction is to provide the first PE-based PUF that offers non-linear scaling of
the CRP space and therefore enables versatile adaptation to a wide field of potential target appli-
cations, that could not be addressed before. Additionally, the aim is to use standard components
and simple circuit design to enable the potential of being fully fabricated with PE technology.
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3.2.2 Differential Circuit PUF
The DiffC-PUF is designed based on the requirements obtained from the previous analysis. The
design utilizes a resistor-transistor-logic (RTL) inverter array, also referred to as the PUF core.
Array structures enable scaling of the PUF CRP space. In general, each RTL inverter consists
of a resistor and a metal-oxide-semiconductor field-effect transistor (MOSFET). If the input of
the inverter is set to a logical high level, a voltage divider is formed between the resistor and
the drain-source resistance of the transistor. As a consequence, the logical low level of the RTL
inverter does not reach electrical ground. Due to process variations, the transistors’ threshold
voltages differ slightly. This leads to variations in the drain currents and thus results in varying
inverter output voltages. The existence of threshold variations in transistors was firstly utilized
by Lofstrom et al. in [100] to identify integrated circuits. If the magnitude of the variations is
very small, the evaluation logic must be of high precision. In the context of security primitives
for lightweight devices and systems, this is an important factor to be considered. Using RTL
inverter arrays instead of transistor arrays additionally includes resistance variations from the
resistors. This results in higher magnitudes of variations. A simple comparator can be used to
compare the output voltages of two inverters and generate one digital response bit.
Figure 3.2 shows the basic DiffC-PUF design. Bidirectional multiplexers (BIMUXs) are used
to arbitrarily select a pair of any two different inverters. In the input path, a predefined inverter
biasing voltage +in is routed to the inputs of the two addressed inverters with the addresses
0: and 1: . Correspondingly, the output signals of the addressed inverters are forwarded to a
comparator (COMP). The COMP generates one digital bit based on its input voltages. The term
’Differential Circuit PUF’ originates from the pairwise voltage comparison approach used for
PUF response generation. The advantage of this differential technique is that fluctuations of the
PUF core’s supply voltage VDDcore and its impact on the inverter output voltage are suppressed.
Thus, the voltage difference at the comparator inputs Δ+out = +out,0: −+out,1: is kept stable over

























































Figure 3.2: DiffC-PUF design including the PUF core inverter array and the control logic (cf. [207]).
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3.2.3 Challenge and Response Generation
The DiffC-PUF challenges can be configured through the selection of the inverter pairs to be
evaluated. A challenge comprises a set of sub-challenges 2: , where each sub-challenge consists
of the inverter addresses 0: , 1: , and the inverter biasing voltage +in. The sub-challenge 2: is
defined according to Equation (3.1) [33]. The inverter biasing voltage +in can be used to obtain
an additional degree of freedom in challenge configuration. Since this increases the complexity
of the control logic, e.g. by using additional digital-to-analog-converters (DACs) to adjust +in
during operation, the inverter biasing voltage is typically fixed.
Definition 3.1. The :-th DiffC-PUF sub-challenge 2: is defined as:
2: = (0: , 1: , +8=) | 0: , 1: ∈ {0, 1, . . . , " − 1} (3.1)
where 0: and 1: are the inverter addresses of the selected pair,+in is the inverter biasing voltage,
and " denotes the number of PUF core inverters.
For each challenge, one PUF response ' is generated, including the sub-responses A: . In general,
the 1-bit sub-response A: is a function of the sub-challenge 2: .
Definition 3.2. The :-th DiffC-PUF sub-response A: to sub-challenge 2: is defined as:
A: = 5 (2: ). (3.2)
The DiffC-PUF’s control logic allows to address the inverters arbitrarily, which enables free





























































Figure 3.3: PUF challenge building methods. (a) Visualization of the permutation-based readdressing method.
(b) Visualization of the differential addressing method.
Challenge Building Method 1: Readdressing
The readdressing method allows all possible unique permutations of inverter address pairs,
as visualized in Figure 3.3a. In general, two inverter addresses can either be addressed in
the combination (0: , 1: ) or (1: , 0: ). Reversing the addresses leads to inverted sub-response
bits, which degrades the information content in proportion to the absolute response bit width.
Therefore, each address combination may only occur once in the set of all sub-challenges
provided by the PUF. In a mathematical sense, this can be expressed by (0: , 1: ) = (1: , 0: ). In
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the readdressing method, the maximum response bit width (single response) can be achieved.
In this case, the response bit width !max equals the number of possible sub-challenges and is
determined by Equation 3.3.
Definition 3.3. The maximum response bit width of a DiffC-PUF with " inverters if using the
readdressing method is limited to:
!max =
" · (" − 1)
2
. (3.3)
Challenge Building Method 2: Differential Addressing
In the differential addressing method, each inverter address is used only once among all sub-
challenges, as visualized in Figure 3.3b. The maximum response bit width that can be achieved
for a single response is limited to !max = "/2 (Equation (3.4)), where " is the number of PUF
core inverters. At a first glance, this method seems to be inefficient. However, if an unauthorized
party (attacker) reveals information about some CRPs, it would be almost impossible to draw
conclusions about other internal dependencies of the PUF. In this regard, further discussions
about the entropy of the PUF responses can be found in Section 6.2.2.
Definition 3.4. The maximum response bit width of a DiffC-PUF with " inverters if using the





3.3 Embedded PUF Platform Implementation
3.3.1 Implementation Rationale & Requirements
In the previous section the basic DiffC-PUF design based on the acquired requirements was
described. The rationale behind the hardware and software implementations of the DiffC-PUF
is mainly described by the following considerations:
• The DiffC-PUF design is split into the following building blocks: Microcontroller, control
logic, and PUF core. The modular platform architecture enables large-scale characteriza-
tion of the fabricated PUF cores.
• The DiffC-PUF core circuit design is kept minimalist to enable PE fabrication. The circuit
design complexity of the control logic is reduced to standard components to offer the
potential of being fully printed in the future.
• An off-the-shelf microcontroller with standard components that is widely used in the IoE
area is utilized to ensure compatibility with existing systems.
• The systematic errors in the evaluation electronics are reduced by using silicon components
with low variations as well as equal temperature and humidity coefficients.
• The DiffC-PUF evaluation platform can be configured and controlled by a personal com-
puter (PC).
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3.3.2 Top-Level Architecture
The DiffC-PUF design imposes the following requirements to be considered in the embedded
PUF platform architecture: (1) Scalability: The DiffC-PUF is a weak PUF design enabling non-
linear scaling of the CRP space. (2) Differential response generation: The PUF response bits
are generated utilizing a differential evaluation approach to mitigate supply voltage variations
(please refer to Section 3.2.2 for more information). (3)Modularity: The functionality of the em-
bedded PUF platform can be split into the control unit (PC and microcontroller), the addressing
and bit generation logic, and the PUF core circuit. (4) Automation: Computer-driven platform
configuration and statistical readout.
The design goal of the embedded PUF platform architecture is to perform the first comprehen-
sive statistical analysis in terms of security metrics on PE-based PUFs. This enables expressive
comparison with other PUFs.






























































































Figure 3.4: DiffC-PUF platform block diagram (cf. [33]). DAC: Digital-to-analog converter, ADC: Analog-to-
digital converter, MUX: Multiplexer, DEMUX: Demultiplexer, BA: Buffer amplifier.
Figure 3.4 shows the top-level architecture of the embedded DiffC-PUF platform. All confi-
guration and data communication between the PC and the microcontroller is done through the
Universal Serial Bus (USB) interface. The communication protocol is based on the Standard
Commands for Programmable Instruments (SCPI), that provides a common syntax, command
structure, and data formats [208]. The power supply voltages for the control logic and PUF
core can be configured by the user and is provided by digital-to-analog converters (DACs).
Alternatively, external power supplies can be attached to the platform. The output voltages of
the selected inverter pairs are passed through a first-order RC low-pass filter with a cut-off
frequency of 52 ≈ 10 kHz, to limit the signal bandwidth of the readout path [33]. The voltages
at the comparator input terminals can be measured by on-board ADCs. The intention behind
the integration of the ADCs is to enable large-scale characterization. The platform can be fully
configured via a single interface, which allows to change the operating conditions (the PUF core
supply voltage VDDcore and the inverter biasing voltage +in) during operation.
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3.3.3 Silicon-Based PUF Platform Implementation
The DiffC-PUF platform comprises three printed circuit boards (PCBs). The microcontroller is
a Silicon Labs EFM32LG on the STK3600 development board [209]. The control logic includes
the addressing and response bit generation components and is hosted on a separate PCB, the
so-called Evaluation Board. The Evaluation Board is set up with discrete components with low
variations and equal temperature as well as humidity coefficients. The cautious choice of the
components reduces the systematic failures of the evaluation platform when being operated
under different environmental conditions. Figure 3.5 shows the PCB layout of the Evaluation
Board.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.5: Silicon-based DiffC-PUF Evaluation Board (Revision 4) PCB. (a) PCB layout. (b) Top view on the
fabricated PCB.
The hardware configuration incorporates the PUF core inverter array with eight RTL inverters,
which are hosted on a third PCB. Two 1-to-8 demultiplexers (DEMUXs) are used to arbitrarily
address the inputs of one inverter pair. Two 8-to-1 multiplexers (MUXs) route the outputs of
the addressed inverters to the comparator inputs, correspondingly. Buffer amplifiers are used to
separate the electrical load between the Evaluation Board and the PUF core.
Figure 3.6 shows the PCB layout of the silicon-based PUF core. Since this is a prototype imple-
mentation, large-area metal pads are carried out to the design to enable manual measurements.
For the RTL inverters, surface-mounted device (SMD) resistors with 10 kΩ and 1 % variation
from one batch and a MOSFET transistor array (ALD1106) are used. The partitioned design
allows to substitute each of the three modules, which enables large-scale characterization. Please
refer to Chapter 4 for the statistical results of the fabricated silicon-based PUF cores.
3.3.4 Hybrid PUF Implementation
One of the major challenges to enable large-scale characterization of electronics based on novel
materials is themissing integration capability.When attaching a printed to a silicon-based circuit,
the materials must be compatible and the interface must be defined. The herein used printing
substrate is an ITO-covered 20 mm × 20 mm glass (PGO CEC020S) with a layer thickness of
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.6: Silicon-based DiffC-PUF core PCB. (a) PCB layout. (b) Top view on the fabricated PCB.
100 nm. In our lab setup, these dimensions are the basis for all printing tasks. To integrate the
substrate hosting the printed PUF core circuit into the PUF evaluation platform, a silicon-based
adapter PCB is designed. The adapter PCB layout is shown in Figure 3.7. The design offers
36 gold-coated bonding pads that are used to establish a connection between the PE-based and
the silicon-based interfaces. Additionally, the adapter PCB exhibits large-area pads for manual
measurements.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.7: Silicon-based DiffC-PUF core adapter PCB. (a) PCB layout of the flip chip adapter PCB. (b) Top view
on the fabricated PCB for printed PUF core integration.
In this context, we use the term hybrid PUF to describe the DiffC-PUF incorporating silicon-
based and PE components. The PUF core circuit is fabricated with inkjet-printing technology.
Similar to its silicon-based counterpart, it consists of an RTL inverter array. The inverters are
realized with EGTs and resistive indium tin oxide (ITO) meander structures as load resistors.
Figure 3.8 shows the simplified fabrication process of the printed PUF core and its integration
onto the adapter PCB.
In step 1, the signal routing, the resistor meander structures, and the transistor electrodes are
laser-ablated from an ITO-covered glass substrate, using a Trumpf TruMicro5000 laser.
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In step 2, the EGT’s seminconductor channel (indium oxide – In2O3), the electrolyte (composite
solid polymer electrolyte –CSPE), and the top gate (poly(3,4ethylenedioxythiophene):poly(styre-
nesulfonate) – PEDOT:PSS) are printed. The inkjet-printer Fujitsu Dimatix DMP-2850 is used
to perform all printing steps. The placement of the components follows a symmetrical align-
ment. Thereby, the input/output (I/O) terminals of all inverters are connected to bonding pads.
This reduces the integration complexity into the silicon-based circuits. Furthermore, no printed
crossovers are needed, which is an example for hybrid systems where the advantages of both
technologies can be combined.
In step 3, the printed PUF core is integrated onto the adapter PCB by using a mounting technique
derived from the flip chip technology [210]. The flip chip approach allows automatic integration
at ambient room temperatures. The process includes adhesive dispensing on the adapter PCB as
well as precise alignment and mounting of the PUF core substrate onto the PCB.
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Figure 3.8: Fabrication process of the printed PUFcore and integration onto the adapter PCB. Step 1: ITO structuring
by laser ablation of the PUF core circuit including routing strips, resistors, I/O, and transistor terminals.
Step 2: Inkjet-printing of the EGT layers, such as In2O3 (channel), electrolyte (gate insulation), and top
gate (PEDOT:PSS). Step 3: Flip chip adopted mounting process of the inkjet-printed PUF core onto the
adapter PCB using conductive adhesive (cf. [98]).
Figure 3.9a shows a rendering of the printed PUF core with eight RTL inverters on a glass
substrate. Each inverter is connected to four bonding pads (gold-colored), where three pads are
occupied by the transistor’s drain (Vout), gate (Vin), source (GND) electrodes, and the fourth pad
is connected to the PUF core supply voltage (VDDcore). Figure 3.9b shows a photograph of a
fabricated PUF core mounted onto an adapter PCB. The mounted adapter PCB can be attached
to the silicon-based PUF evaluation platform by a connector. This allows to substitute the printed
PUF cores, which accelerates the large-scale characterization process. Please refer to Chapter 5
for the statistical results on printed PUF cores. At this point we want to note that the circuit
complexity of the Evaluation Board is kept as low as possible to offer the potential of being fully
fabricated with PE technology in the near future.
Figure 3.10 shows the scanning electron microscopy (SEM) image of a printed EGT. The image
displays the non-uniformity of the semiconductor/electrolyte interface, which is used as intrinsic
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variation source of the PUF. The inlet close-up image shows the ITO filmwith the known 100 nm
layer thickness as a reference. The inkjet-printed thin-film semiconductor (In2O3) layer has a
determined thickness of ≈50 nm.
RTL inverter
(a) (b)
Figure 3.9: (a) Rendering of a printed PUF core on a glass substrate. (b) Photograph of a fabricated PUF core
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Figure 3.10: Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) image of a printed EGT showing the non-uniformity of the
semiconductor/electrolyte interface (cf. [98]).
3.3.5 Software Implementation
The DiffC-PUF platform can be fully controlled from a PC via the USB interface. The PC soft-
ware implementation offers the functionality to configure the PUF platform, send challenges,
receive responses, and trigger voltage measurements. The entire data communication between
the PC and the microcontroller is based on SCPI commands.
Figure 3.11 shows the software components of the microcontroller implementation. The PUF
platform framework includes the high-level functionalities that are visible for the user. The
control unit processes the challenge configuration and handles the corresponding PUF response.
The supply and measurement unit configures the PUF-internal supply voltages (inverter biasing
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voltage+in and PUF core supply voltage VDDcore) as well as the optional analog voltage measu-
rements with the on-board 12-bit ADCs. The minimum resolvable signal by the ADC is 500 µV.
To reduce ADC quantization errors, averaging over eight measurements is performed [33]. The
platform can be configured either for manual or automatic operation. In the manual operation
mode, the sub-challenges are entered via buttons and the Liquid Crystal Display (LCD). In
the automatic operation mode, the platform is controlled by a PC. The user can enter challen-
ges through challenge configuration files, or use the implemented random challenge generator.
Challenges and measured responses are stored in a file database. If additional analog voltage
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Figure 3.11: Software components of the microcontroller implementation.
The core libraries include basic functionalities, such as the SCPI command parser and the plat-
form configurations. The lowermost layer shows the driver libraries required for communication
and the periphery components. The UART interface is used in combination with an UART-to-
USB converter for the communicationwith the PC. Figure 3.12 visualizes the challenge-response
generation procedure of the DiffC-PUF. The sub-challenge 2: determines the selected inverter
pair with the address tuple (0: , 1: ). The analog inverter output signals (+comp,+ and +comp,−)
at the comparator input terminals change based on the inverter addressing configuration. The
sampling time Csample determines the point in time where the response bit A: is read by the
microcontroller and the ADCs convert the inverter output voltages to binary 12-bit values. In
the shown scenario, the voltage difference at the comparator input terminals Δ+comp is positive,
which leads to the sub-response bit A: = 1.
The timing of the sub-response bit and ADC sampling can be configured through SCPI com-
mands by adjusting the CB,1 and CB,2 delay parameters, as shown in Figure 3.13. The CB,1 value
describes the time gap between applying the inverter addresses to the BIMUXs and the sampling
time Csample. The choice of this parameter depends on the used technology. The MOSFETs used
in the silicon-based PUF core offer a high switching speed, which means that the inverter output
signal remains stable after a very short time period. As a consequence, the CB,1 parameter can
be set to a small value. On the other hand, the printed EGTs offer a relatively low switching
speed. Therefore, the sampling time CB,1 should be increased to achieve reliable response bits.






































































































Figure 3.12: DiffC-PUF signal path for response generation. The PUF challenge is split into sub-challenges 2: to















Figure 3.13: Exemplary timing diagram of the response generation (cf. [33]).
Figure 3.14 shows the simplified flow diagrams of the PC (Figure 3.14a) and microcontroller
(Figure 3.14a) software implementations. The PC sends a PUF challenge command. The micro-
controller receives the command and starts to process the challenge. After all sub-response bits
have been generated, the response is returned to the PC.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have identified the essential requirements on PUFs suitable for PE technology.
On that basis, we have presented detailed features on the DiffC-PUF design as well as the
top-level architecture of the hardware and software implementations. The evaluation platform is
split into three building blocks: (1) Microcontroller, (2) evaluation board, and (3) the PUF core.
The implemented hardware design is based on eight PUF core inverters in resistor-transistor-
logic. The microcontroller and the evaluation board are based on silicon electronic components,
whereas the PUF core can either be fabricated with silicon or printed inverters. The PE-based
circuits are printed onto ITO-covered 20 mm × 20 mm glass substrates. To integrate the PE circuit
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Figure 3.14: DiffC-PUF platform software implementation. Simplified flow diagrams of (a) the PC software and
(b) the microcontroller software (cf. [33]). The dotted frames indicate optional processing steps.
into the evaluation system, a specially designed flip chip adapter PCB have been designed. This
modular design enables large-scale characterization of fully silicon and PE-based hybrid PUFs,
since the PUF cores can be substituted on demand. The embedded evaluation platform can be
fully controlled by a computer via the USB interface. The software components and the bit
generation process are shown and described in detail. This is the basis for the evaluations carried
out in the subsequent chapters.
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4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we have outlined the background of security in general, the state of
the art in PUFs as well as arising security threats. Moreover, in Chapter 3 we have introduced
the DiffC-PUF design and developed the modular embedded PUF platform for the evaluation of
silicon as well as PE-based hybrid PUFs. Most of the PUFs reported in literature are based on
silicon electronics and obtain their unique PUF characteristics from variations induced during
the manufacturing process. To create a basis of comparison with other silicon-based PUF design,
in this chapter the embedded PUF platformwill be evaluated using discretely constructed silicon-
based PUF cores. To assess the identification capabilities of the DiffC-PUF, the FAR and FRR
values are computed and compared with related works. In this chapter we aim to:
• Employ fabricated silicon PUF cores for statistical tests under realistic operating conditi-
ons.
• Conduct a comprehensive experimental analysis by defining the experiment goals.
• Present statistical analysis of the PUF security metrics including uniqueness, reproduci-
bility, bit aliasing, and uniformity based on experimental data.
• Investigate and assess the biometric identification capabilities of the fabricated silicon-
based DiffC-PUFs by computing the FAR and FRR values.
4.2 Experimental Analysis
4.2.1 Experiment Goals
The goal of the experiments on the silicon-based DiffC-PUF is to assess the security capabilities
of fabricated PUF core instances under realistic operating conditions. To compare our evaluation
results with other works, we use the well-established PUF security metrics, as introduced in
Section 2.3.4. In the literature, different PUF types are often compared and ranked only based
on their security metric performances. At this point we want to mention that an objective
comparison should also consider the envisioned target applications of the PUFs. For example,
the security requirements might differ between identification and cryptographic applications.
For many identification tasks, strong PUFs with huge CRP spaces are not required and their
integration could even fail due to cost constraints. Here, we will provide an experimental analysis
of the uniqueness, reliability, bit aliasing, and uniformity metrics. Furthermore, a comprehensive
bit error analysis is conducted. Based on our statistical evaluations, we will identify possible
target applications for the silicon-based DiffC-PUF.
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4.2.2 Experiment Setup
To empirically evaluate the characteristics of the fabricated silicon-based PUF core instances,
we have fabricated 30 samples and tested them under varying operating conditions. We consider
variations of the ambient temperature in the range of −20 ◦C up to 80 ◦C. Furthermore, the
PUF core supply voltage (VDDcore) and the inverter biasing voltage (+in) are varied by ±10 %,
respectively. Table 4.1 shows the test configurations applied in our experiments. The reference
test case %11 denotes nominal conditions, where the ambient temperature is 25 ◦C, the PUF core
supply voltage is VDDcore = 1.0 V, and the inverter biasing voltage is+in = 1.0 V. The other test
cases represent corner conditions. The followingmethodology is used to generate PUF responses
for our statistical security metric evaluations:
1. Reference challenge: A fixed reference challenge is built using the readdressing method
and applied to the PUFs. The reference challenge includes all combinations of inverter
address pairs without repetitions.
2. Reference response: For each PUF core instance a reference response is extracted by
applying the reference challenge. The reference response is determined through majority
voting among 125 PUF responses extracted under nominal operating conditions.
3. Data aquisition: For each PUF core instance and experimental test case, the PUF response
is extracted 125 times by applying the reference challenge. The resulting responses are
stored in a database.
4. Evaluation: The PUF responses are evaluated in terms of the PUF security metrics. The
uniqueness, reliability, bit aliasing, and uniformity metrics are computed and evaluated.
The fabricated PUF cores incorporate eight RTL inverters, as explained in Section 3.3.3. The
maximum bit width that can be achieved for a single PUF response by using the readdressing
method is 28-bit (according to Equation (3.3)). Figure 4.1 shows a photograph of the fabricated
silicon-based DiffC-PUF platform.
Development board Evaluation Board Silicon-based PUF core PCB
ADC
Bidirectional multiplexersComparatorMicrocontroller
Figure 4.1: Photograph of the DiffC-PUF platform including the EFM32 development board, the silicon-based
Evaluation Board, and the silicon-based PUF core PCB (from left to right).
In total, 15 × 125 × 30 = 56, 250 PUF responses with a length of 28 bits are evaluated for the
statistical analysis of the security metrics. For our evaluations, the PUFs are operated in a
Weiss WK3 climatic chamber to have a controlled ambient environment. The supply voltages
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4.3 Experimental Security Metrics Results
4.3.1 Uniqueness Results
As defined in Equation (2.10), the uniquenessmetric is determined by themean value of the inter-
HDdistribution. A uniqueness value close to 50 % indicates unique PUF responses. Typically, the
uniqueness is measured at nominal operating conditions, which corresponds to test case %11 from
Table 4.1.We apply a fixed reference challenge (including all 28 possible sub-challenges) to each
PUF instance and measure the responses. In total, we evaluate the responses of 30 fabricated
PUF cores with the DiffC-PUF platform and two Evaluation Boards A and B. Figure 4.2a
and Figure 4.2b show the inter-HD distributions measured with two identically constructed
Evaluation Boards A and B, respectively. Both computed uniqueness values are similar with a
mean of `inter = `





inter = 18.8 %. The similar
values imply that the uniqueness is not negatively affected by variations in the Evaluation Board
circuitry and components. This is consistent with our design goal of reducing systematic errors
in the DiffC-PUF platform.
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Figure 4.2: Inter-HD distributions for the reference responses of 30 fabricated silicon-based DiffC-PUFs using
(a) Evaluation Board A (cf. [33]) and (b) Evaluation Board B.
4.3.2 Reproducibility Results
The reproducibility of a PUF is determined by the intra-HD distribution and the bit errors
that occur due to changing operating conditions or aging. To compute the reliability metric
according to Equation (2.12), we use the test cases %1 to %15 from Table 4.1 to measure the PUF
responses from 10 fabricated PUF cores. The reason for using 10 instead of all 30 fabricated
DiffC-PUF cores for our reproducibility investigations is the high complexity of the evaluation
process in terms of measurement equipment and time. We calculate the intra-HDs between the
PUF responses measured under nominal (%11) and corner conditions. Figure 4.3a shows the
intra-HD distribution for the PUF responses. Figure 4.3b shows the calculated reliability values.
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The resulting mean reliability value is `intra = 99.2 % which is close to ideal. This means that
the PUF responses are reproducible.
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Figure 4.3: (a) Intra-HD distribution and (b) reliability values for 10 fabricated silicon-based DiffC-PUF core
instances (cf. [33]).
It is often useful to gain more insight into the bit errors that occur while re-extracting PUF
responses. Typical causes for evoking bit errors include noise, environmental effects, and aging.
For our bit error evaluation, we apply a fixed reference challenge to all PUF instances. The
PUF responses are re-extracted 125 times under different ambient temperatures (%1 to %6).
Figure 4.4a shows the bit errors computed from the PUF responses. The plot shows increased bit
error values at ambient temperatures of −20 ◦C and 80 ◦C. The results show that the responses
can be generated reproducibly in the ambient temperature range of 0 ◦C and 60 ◦C.
In a further experiment, we investigate the dependency between the occurence of bit errors and
the used Evaluation Board. Therefore, we operate the 30 fabricated DiffC-PUF core instances at
nominal conditions (%11) by utilizing two identically constructed Evaluation Boards A and B,
respectively. Figure 4.4b shows the resulting mean bit error values across the measured PUF
cores. The bit errors remain stable if comparing the measurements of both Evaluation Boards.
PUF core 20 shows the largest bit error values. In this context wewant to note, that the herein used
PUF platform also measures the comparator input voltages that cause response bit generation.
Figure 4.4c shows the corresponding comparator input voltage differencesΔ+comp for each single
PUF response bit. The sub-response bit positions A0, A6, A12, and A25 show small values below
200 µV. The whiskers of the box plots indicate that the comparator input voltage difference
Δ+comp sometimes changes from positive to negative, and vice versa. This leads to bit errors in
the binary PUF responses.
4.3.3 Bit Aliasing Results
The bit aliasing metric measures the distribution of 0s and 1s for each single PUF response bit
index. In this context, a bit aliasing value of 0 % for bit position 8 means that all PUF instances
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(c)
Figure 4.4: (a) Bit errors across ambient temperature for 10 fabricated silicon-based DiffC-PUF core instances.
(b) Bit errors across 30 fabricated PUF core instances and two Evaluation Boards. (c) Comparator input
voltage differences Δ+comp per response bit position of PUF core 20 (cf. [33]).
produce a 0. Accordingly, a bit aliasing value of 100 % indicates a fixed bit value of 1. Both cases
are referred to as ’complete bit aliasing’. For our evaluations, we compute the bit aliasing metric
for 30 fabricated PUF cores according to Equation (2.13). A fixed reference challenge is applied
to the PUFs and the responses are generated under nominal operating conditions. Figure 4.5
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shows the resulting bit aliasing values for each response bit index. The mean bit aliasing value
is 45.6 %, which is close to the ideal value of 50 %. The minimum and maximum bit aliasing
values are 26.7 % and 63.3 %, respectively. These results show, that no complete bit aliasing
happens, which means that the uniqueness metric is not negatively affected by frozen bits.



















 1 Bit aliasing per response bit index
Mean bit aliasing
Figure 4.5: Bit aliasing values for 28-bit responses generated under nominal operating conditions.
4.3.4 Uniformity Results
The uniformity metric is a measure of the 0s and 1s distribution of the PUF response bits.
Based on the envisioned target application of a PUF, specific requirements on the uniformity of
the PUF responses do arise. For example, RNGs should ideally produce unpredictable binary
bit sequences where the 0s and 1s occur equiprobable. The performance of a PUF in terms
of the uniformity of its PUF responses is important for applications that require true random
numbers, such as cryptography. For our analysis, we operate 30 fabricated PUF cores under
nominal conditions (%11). A fixed reference challenge is applied to the PUFs and the responses
are extracted. According to Equation (2.14), the resulting mean uniformity value is 45.6 %. The
boxplot in Figure 4.6 shows the uniformity values. The range of the whiskers is relatively wide,
which means that some PUFs generate responses that are non-uniform. This fact limits possible
target applications to tasks where a lower security level is sufficient. Further discussions on the
applicability of the silicon-based DiffC-PUF will be carried out in the next section.
4.4 Identification Capabilities
In Section 2.3.5, various performance metrics to assess the identification and authentication
capabilities of a PUF were presented. Thereby, the reproducibility and the uniqueness of the
PUF responses are of major interest. Hence, the fuzziness of the PUF responses, described by the
overlapping region between the intra-HD and inter-HDdistributions, determine the identifiability
of the PUF. For our evaluations, we consider an identification system based on silicon-based
DiffC-PUFs with eight PUF core inverters, as proposed in the previous sections. Figure 4.7
shows the intra-HD (black line) and inter-HD (dash-dot red line) distributions for the responses
obtained from fabricated DiffC-PUFs. The black dashed line indicates the point, where both
distributions intersect. At this point we want to note that the raw PUF response data is used to
investigate the performance capabilities. The FAR and FRR values are calculated according to
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Figure 4.6: Boxplot of the uniformity values.
Equation (2.15) and Equation (2.16), respectively. Firstly, we calculate the FAR and FRR values
for the intersection point of both distributions. The determined FAR value is 2.14 % (-1.67),
whereas the FRR value is 0.47 % (-2.33). Typically, the percentual values are converted to the
log10(·) notation, as denoted by the values in the brackets. The corresponding identification
threshold is at 12.14 %. Secondly, we determine the point, where FAR=FRR, the so-called EER.
The resulting FAR and FRR values are 1.57 % (-1.80), respectively. In this case, the identification
threshold decreases slightly to 10.16 %.
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Figure 4.7: Intra-HD and inter-HD distributions for the measured PUF responses. The overlapping region is split
by the identification threshold into the false-acceptance-rate (FAR) and the false-rejection-rate (FRR).
In general, the required identification performance (FAR and FRR) as well as the optimal
identification threshold thid of an identification system depend on the actual target application.
In many cases, FAR and FRR values of ≤ 10−6 are minimally desired [43]. To reach such
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values, additional post-processing, such as error-correction techniques, can further improve the
identifiability of the identification system. Please note, that post-processing is not part of this
work and is therefore not discussed. However, the herein presented FAR, FRR, and EER values
allow to compare the identification performances between the silicon-based and the hybrid
DiffC-PUFs. Futhermore, the identification threshold based on the raw response data is also an
important factor to be considered when constructing a suitable error-correction.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented the statistical analysis based on experimental response data
obtained from 30 fabricated silicon-based PUF cores. The PUFs were operated in a climatic
chamber under controlled ambient conditions. A large-scale characterization has been perfor-
med. The response data produced by the PUFs in various experiments (see Table 4.1) were
evaluated in terms of the security metrics including uniqueness, reproducibility, bit aliasing,
and uniformity. Finally, the identification capabilities to provide secure entity identification of
the silicon-based DiffC-PUFs have been investigated. The most relevant results are shown in
Table 5.6, including other related works. Please note that our evaluations are based on raw PUF
responses without additional post-processing such as error correction. Nonetheless, the silicon-
based DiffC-PUF shows nearly ideal values in terms of uniqueness and reliability. In order to
obtain a cryptographic level of authentication security (FAR and FRR values), we propose to
apply further post-processing on the PUF responses.
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5.1 Introduction
Most of the currently known PUF designs based on novel materials and PE technology feature
promising physical characteristics for providing hardware-intrinsic security. However, the as-
sessment of the security capabilities requires comprehensive statistical analysis, which has not
been addressed for any novel material PUF, yet. In this chapter, we extract physical randomness
from printed thin-film metal-oxide devices. At this point it should be noted that there are no da-
tasheets available for the utilized printed PUF core inverters. Simulations help to investigate the
characteristics of electronic circuits and to determine the best operating point. This knowledge
can then be applied to fabricated devices. Since the herein discussed PUF evaluation platform
enables large-scale characterization, a large number of PUF responses can be generated auto-
matically. This allows for comprehensive statistical evaluations on the security metrics and the
identification capabilities, which is important for authentication tasks. Furthermore, we validate
the randomness of the PUF responses and investigate the suitability for cryptography. Finally,
the performance in terms of security metrics of the hybrid PUF is compared with a selection of
other related PUFs. In this chapter we aim to:
• Introduce an evaluation workflow to simulate hybrid PUFs from the analog voltage level
up to the digital PUF responses. Furthermore, we perform Monte Carlo simulations to
investigate the random variations of the printed PUF core inverters.
• Evaluate the hybrid PUF based on simulations in terms of the security metrics including
uniqueness, reproducibility, bit aliasing, and uniformity.
• Determine the best operating point of the printed PUF cores, where the variations are
maximum.
• Employ fabricated hybrid PUFs for statistical tests at the best operating point and under
varying operating conditions.
• Evaluate the fabricated hybrid PUFs in terms of the security metrics including uniqueness,
reproducibility, bit aliasing, and uniformity.
• Investigate and assess the biometric identification capabilities of the fabricated hybrid
PUFs by computing the FAR and FRR.
• Validate the randomness of the PUF responses using the NIST Statistical Test Suite
(NIST-STS).
• Compare the hybrid PUF with other PUFs in terms of the security metrics and the
identification capabilities.
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5.2 Experimental Analysis
5.2.1 Experiment Goals
The goal of the experiments on the hybrid PUF incorporating printed PUF cores is to asses its
security capabilities. For the sake of simplicity, from here on we use the term ’hybrid PUF’
to describe the DiffC-PUF comprising the silicon-based Evaluation Board and the integrated
printed PUF core. The main objective is to analyze the characteristics of the printed PUF
cores. In this context, Monte Carlo (MC) simulations will be performed to investigate the RTL
inverter characteristics. To assess the security performance capabilities of the hybrid PUF, the
MC simulation results on the analog voltage level must be transferred to binary PUF responses.
Therefore, an evaluation tool is required to simulate the complete PUF behavior, including the
Evaluation Board logic components and the response bit generation. At this point, the goal is to
provide a scalable evaluation tool that is not exclusively limited to the hybrid PUF configuration
as used for the fabricated devices. On that basis, the simulated hybrid PUF will be evaluated in
terms of security metrics and the theoretical best operating point will be determined. This is an
important step, since the simulation-based statistical results will be the basis for the subsequent
experimental characterization of the fabricated hybrid PUFs. In total, 15 fabricated hybrid PUFs
will be operated under changing operating conditions. Based on the measured PUF responses,
the security capabilities will be determined. Finally, possible target applications will be defined
and the performance will be compared with related PUF designs.
5.2.2 Simulation Environment & Setup
To gain insights into the printed PUF core circuit behavior, the transfer characteristics of the
printed RTL inverters are investigated. To analyze the effects of printing process variations,
we perform MC simulations. The MC simulations are based on the Enz-Krummenacher-Vittoz
semi-physical model developed by Rasheed et al. in [211]. Further information on the used
variation model for the EGTs can be found in [212]. For temperature modeling, we use the
coefficient-based approach introduced by Erozan et al. in [124, 125]. Figure 5.1 shows the
workflow used for the hybrid PUF simulations.












































Figure 5.1: Monte Carlo simulations of printed RTL inverters and evaluation workflow of hybrid PUFs (cf. [207]).
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In step 1, MC simulations are carried out for different simulation parameters, including the
inverter biasing voltage+in, the PUF core supply voltage VDDcore, and the PUF core temperature
)core. The parameters represent the nominal and corner conditions for PUF operation, which are
used to compute the PUF security metrics. Table 5.1 shows the simulation parameters with the
corresponding value ranges. The resistor '! is set to a fixed value of 10 kΩ. For all parameter
combinations, the inverter output voltages are simulated and stored in a database.
Table 5.1: Monte Carlo simulation parameters and value range.
Parameter Value range Description
+in 0 V, 0.1 V, . . . 1.0 V Inverter biasing voltage
VDDcore 0.9 V, 1.0 V∗, 1.1 V Inverter supply voltage
)core −20 ◦C, 23 ◦C∗, 60 ◦C PUF core temperature
Note: ∗Nominal conditions.
In step 2, the PUF cores are assembled by grouping the inverter output voltages obtained from
the MC simulations. In general, the number of PUF core inverters can be chosen arbitrarily. The
functionality of the Evaluation Board including the addressing and bit generation is implemented
in Python. To consider noise in the bit generation logic, an additional noise level can be specified.
Figure 5.2 shows how the noise level+n affects the comparator input voltages+comp,+ and+comp,−.
The comparator input voltages are defined according to Equations (5.1) and (5.2).
+comp,+ = +out,0: ±+n
+comp,− = +out,1: ±+n
(5.1)
(5.2)
For the simulations, different noise levels in the range of+n = {0 mV, 0.5 mV, 1.0 mV, . . . 10.0 mV}
are applied, whereas a noise level of 0 mV denotes nominal conditions. All permutations of













Figure 5.2: Hybrid PUF comparator input noise level modeling. (cf. [207]).
The PUF responses are generated based on inverter output voltage comparisons and under
consideration of the noise levels. The following methodology is used to generate PUF responses
for further evaluations:
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1. Reference challenge: A fixed reference challenge is applied, including all combinations of
inverter address pairs without repetitions (readdressing method).
2. Reference response: For each simulated PUF core instance and under nominal conditions
a reference response is extracted by applying the reference challenge.
3. Data acquisition: For each simulated PUF core instance, inverter biasing voltage, corner
condition, and noise level the PUF response is re-extracted by applying the reference
challenge. The resulting responses are stored in a database.
Table 5.2: Impacts of the noise level (NL) on the comparator input voltages.
Noise level allocation
Quantity
NL1 NL2 NL3 NL4 NL5 NL6
+out,0: ++n −+n ++n −+n
+out,1: ++n −+n −+n ++n
In step 3, the simulation results at nominal and corner conditions are separated. Finally, the
security metrics are computed and evaluated. In total, 102 × 6 × 150 = 91, 800 PUF responses
with 28-bit are considered in the statistical evaluations of the security metrics [207].
5.2.3 Experiment Setup
To empirically evaluate the characteristics of the 15 fabricated printed DiffC-PUF core instances,
they are tested under varying operating conditions. For our evaluations we consider variations
of the ambient temperature in the range of 20 ◦C up to 60 ◦C. The printed EGTs are typically
operated at a relative humidity of 50 % and show sensitivity to humidity changes. To capture this
effects in our evaluations, we operate the hybrid PUFs in a climatic chamber and vary the relative
humidity in the range of 45 % to 55 %. Furthermore, the PUF core supply voltage (VDDcore)
is varied by ±10 %. Table 5.3 shows the test configurations applied in our experiments. The
reference test case %̃1 denotes nominal conditions where the ambient temperature is 20 ◦C, the
relative humidity is 50 %, and the PUF core inverter supply voltage is VDDcore = 1.0 V. Similar
to our silicon-based DiffC-PUF evaluations, the following methodology is used to generate PUF
responses for our statistical security metric evaluations on the hybrid PUF:
1. Reference challenge: A fixed reference challenge is generated and applied to the hybrid
PUFs. The reference challenge includes all combinations of inverter address pairs without
repetitions (readdressing method).
2. Reference response: For each printed PUF core instance a reference response is extracted
by applying the reference challenge. The reference response is determined throughmajority
voting among 20 PUF responses extracted under nominal operating conditions.
3. Data acquisition: For each printed PUF core instance and experimental test case, the PUF
response is extracted 20 times by applying the reference challenge. The resulting responses
are stored in a database.
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4. Evaluation: The PUF responses are evaluated in terms of the PUF security metrics.
The uniqueness, reproducibility, uniformity, and bit aliasing metrics are computed and
evaluated.
The fabricated printed PUF cores incorporate eight RTL inverters. Figure 5.3 shows a photograph
of the fabricated hybrid DiffC-PUF platform. As described in Section 3.3.4, the printed PUF
core is mounted onto the silicon-based adapter PCB. Please note that the ITO strips are not
visible in the picture due its transparency.




Figure 5.3: Photograph of the hybrid PUF platform including the EFM32 development board, the silicon-based
Evaluation Board, and the adapter PCB incorporating the printed PUF core (from left to right) (cf. [98]).
For our evaluations, the PUFs are operated in a Weiss WK3 climatic chamber to have a con-
trolled ambient environment in terms of temperature and relative humidity. The microcontroller
development board is powered by the USB interface. The Evaluation Board is powered using
the microcontroller development board’s internal 5 V and 3.3 V supply pins. To dynamically
adjust the inverter biasing voltage (+in) and the PUF core inverter supply voltage (VDDcore), two
internal 12-bit DACs of themicrocontroller board are utilized. For the statistical analysis in terms
of security metrics, in total 11 × 20 × 15 = 3, 300 PUF responses with 28-bit are evaluated.
5.3 Simulation-Based Security Metrics Results
5.3.1 Best Operating Point Determination
Before evaluating the PUF security metrics, first of all we want to investigate the variations in
the PUF core inverter output voltages. In the hybrid PUF, the response bit generation is based
on pairwise voltage comparisons. In technical systems, the maximum resolution is limited by
the electrical characteristics of the components. The comparator resolution of our PUF platform
setup (please refer to Section 3.3.3 for more information) is limited by the input offset voltage of
200 µV. As a consequence, higher magnitudes of variations reduce bit errors and lead to a better
reproducibility of the PUF responses. As stated in Section 2.3.1, achieving a good reproducibility
is one of the most important properties that distinguishes PUFs from RNGs.
Figure 5.4 shows the standard deviation of the inverter output voltages +out for different inverter
biasing voltages+in, PUF core supply voltagesVDDcore, and PUF core temperatures)core. For all
temperatures, the maximum standard deviations are reached in the range of+in = [0.3 V, 0.5 V].
The best operating point can be found within this range. From a theoretical point of view, it is
preferable to choose a robust operating point. In general, using the middle of the aforementioned
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Table 5.3: Experiment setup for the hybrid PUF security metric evaluations.
Test Ambient Temperature Rel. humidity VDDcore
case 20◦C∗ 40◦C 60◦C 45 % 50 %∗ 55 % 0.9 V 1.0 V∗ 1.1 V
%̃1 × × ×
%̃2 × × ×
%̃3 × × ×
%̃4 × × ×
%̃5 × × ×
%̃6 × × ×
%̃7 × × ×
%̃8 × × ×
%̃9 × × ×
%̃10 × × ×
%̃11 × × ×
Note: ∗Nominal operating conditions.
range provides a margin that prevents from unstable PUF responses, even if the inverter biasing
voltage drifts due to environmental impacts.
5.3.2 Uniqueness Results
The uniqueness metric is computed according to Equation (2.10), based on PUF responses
generated under nominal operating conditions. In total, we evaluate the reference responses of
150 simulated hybrid PUFs. Figure 5.5 shows the inter-HD distribution for an inverter biasing
voltage of 0.4 V. The uniquenessmetric is determined by themean inter-HDvalue `inter = 50.0 %
with a standard deviation of finter = 14.4 %. The mean value shows that the PUF responses are
distinguishable. Table 5.4 shows the uniqueness results for inverter biasing voltages in the range
of +in = [0.2 V, 1.0 V].
5.3.3 Reproducibility Results
For the reproducibility evaluation, we compute the reliability metric according to Equation 2.12,
based on the responses of 150 simulated hybrid PUFs. We calculate the intra-HDs between the
PUF reference responses generated under nominal operating conditions and the corner responses
extracted under the corner conditions. As described in Section 5.2.2, the nominal conditions
comprise a PUF core inverter supply voltage of VDDcore = 1.0 V and a PUF core temperature of
)core = 23 ◦C. The inverter biasing voltage is gradually increased in 100 mV steps in the range
of +in = [0.2 V, 1.0 V]. Figure 5.6 shows the mean reliability values in dependency of the noise
level and the inverter biasing voltage. If increasing the noise level, the mean reliability values
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Figure 5.4: (a) Measured transfer curves of eight fabricated PUF core inverters, including the standard deviation
(STD(Vout)). (b) – (d) Standard deviations of +out across different inverter biasing voltages +in, PUF
core supply voltages VDDcore, and PUF core temperatures )core (cf. [213]).
decrease for all +in. The results show that the maximum mean reliability values are reached
when biasing the PUF core inverters with +in = 0.4 V, which coincides with the best operating
point determined in Section 5.3.1.
When calculating mean values, outliers might be compensated, which could falsify the results.
Thereby, the minimum reliability value that can be expected limits the field of possible target
applications. Figures 5.7a and 5.7b show the mean and minimum reliability values over different
noise levels and inverter biasing voltages (+in), respectively. All corner conditions are included
in the results. Even for higher noise levels (≥ ±5 mV), the best reliability values are achieved
at +in = 0.4 V. At the best operating point, the mean reliability value is 98.4 %, whereas the
minimum reliability value is 93.7 % at a noise level of ±10 mV. The minimum reliability
value is an indicator for the requirements an error correction must fulfill to achieve error-free
reproducibility of the PUF responses. The histogram in Figure 5.7c shows distribution of the
71
5 Hybrid PUF Characterization & Security Evaluation
0 25 50 75 100













Figure 5.5: Inter-HD distribution for the reference responses of 150 simulated hybrid PUFs (cf. [213]).
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Figure 5.6: Mean reliability values across different noise levels, inverter biasing voltages +in, and PUF core tempe-
ratures )core. (a) )core = −20 ◦C. (b) )core = 23 ◦C. (c) )core = 60 ◦C (cf. [213]).
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reliability values at the best operating point and for different noise levels. Increasing the noise
level degrades the robustness of the response generation. In summary it can be said, that the
reliability results are close to the ideal value of 100 %, which means that the PUF responses are
reproducible.
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Figure 5.7: (a) Mean reliability values and (b) minimum reliability values across different noise levels and inver-
ter biasing voltages. (c) Histogram of the mean reliability values for +in = 0.4 V and different noise
levels (cf. [213]).
5.3.4 Bit Aliasing Results
The bit aliasing metric determines the bias of each single PUF response bit. In this context, a bit
aliasing value of 0 % for bit position 8 means that all PUF instances produce a 0. Accordingly,
a bit aliasing value of 100 % indicates a fixed bit value of 1. Both cases are referred to as
’complete bit aliasing’. Our bit aliasing evaluation is based on responses extracted from 150
simulated hybrid PUFs under nominal operating conditions. According to Equation (2.13), the
bit aliasing is calculated for each single PUF response bit index. We compute the bit aliasing
values for inverter biasing voltages in the range of +in = [0.2 V, 1.0 V]. With a minimum value
of 38.7 % and a maximum value of 60.7 %, no complete bit aliasing happens in the hybrid PUFs.
This implies that there are no frozen bits that negatively affect the uniqueness metric results.
73
5 Hybrid PUF Characterization & Security Evaluation
Figure 5.8 shows the bit aliasing values for an inverter biasing voltage of +in = 0.4 V. The mean
bit aliasing value is 49.8 %, which is close to the ideal value of 50 %. The minimum bit aliasing
value is 42.7 %, whereas the maximum value is 58.0 %, respectively. The good results can be
explained by the nature of printed device fabrication. Because of the additive manufacturing
process with solution-processable materials, each device exhibits its own intrinsic variation
probability distribution [213].



















 1 Bit aliasing per response bit indexMean bit aliasing
Figure 5.8: Bit aliasing values for 28-bit PUF responses at+in = 0.4 V and nominal operating conditions (cf. [213]).
5.3.5 Uniformity Results
The uniformity metric is computed using the responses of 150 simulated hybrid PUFs under
nominal operating conditions, according to Equation (2.14). The resulting mean uniformity
values for inverter biasing voltages in the range of +in = [0.2 V, 1.0 V] are close to the ideal






















Figure 5.9: Boxplot of the uniformity values at +in = 0.4 V and nominal operating conditions.
Themean value is 49.8 %, whereas the spread of the uniformity values iswide, which denotes that
somePUF responses are non-uniform. This limits the suitability of the hybrid PUF to applications
where the uniformity feature is less relevant, such as identification and authentication. However,
at this point we must consider that the evaluations shown in this work are based on raw PUF
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responses without additional post-processing. Please note that the uniformity can be further
improved through techniques such as the entropy distiller as introduced in [214,215].
Table 5.4: Security metrics for the simulated hybrid PUF.
Uniqueness Reliability Bit aliasing Uniformity
Vin
-inter 2inter Min. Mean Min. Mean Max. Min. Mean Max.
0.2 V 50.0 % 14.3 % 87.0 % 95.8 % 39.3 % 49.5 % 58.0 % 10.7 % 49.5 % 92.9 %
0.3 V 50.1 % 14.3 % 90.8 % 97.8 % 41.3 % 49.4 % 57.3 % 10.7 % 49.4 % 85.7 %
0.4 V 50.0 % 14.4 % 93.7 % 98.4 % 42.7 % 49.8 % 58.0 % 7.1 % 49.8 % 82.1 %
0.5 V 50.0 % 14.4 % 92.0 % 98.2 % 43.3 % 49.4 % 60.0 % 7.1 % 49.4 % 85.7 %
0.6 V 50.0 % 14.4 % 92.0 % 98.0 % 44.7 % 49.6 % 60.0 % 7.1 % 49.6 % 85.7 %
0.7 V 50.0 % 14.4 % 92.0 % 97.8 % 44.0 % 49.8 % 59.3 % 7.1 % 49.8 % 85.7 %
0.8 V 50.0 % 14.4 % 91.0 % 97.6 % 44.7 % 49.6 % 60.7 % 10.7 % 49.6 % 85.7 %
0.9 V 50.0 % 14.4 % 88.6 % 97.4 % 43.3 % 49.7 % 60.7 % 10.7 % 49.7 % 82.1 %
1.0 V 49.9 % 14.4 % 87.8 % 97.3 % 42.7 % 49.7 % 60.0 % 14.3 % 49.7 % 82.1 %
5.4 Experimental Security Metrics Results
5.4.1 Uniqueness Results
The uniqueness metric is determined by the mean inter-HD value according to Equation (2.10).
The experiments performed to evaluate the uniqueness metric are described in Section 5.2.3.
A fixed reference challenge is applied to 15 fabricated hybrid PUFs under nominal operating
conditions (test case %̃1 from Table 5.3). The inverter biasing voltage is set to the best operating
point +in = 0.4 V, as explored in our prior simulations (see Section 5.3). Figure 5.10 shows the
inter-HD distribution based on the experimental results and the outcomes of the simulations.
The resulting experimental uniqueness value is `4inter = 51.1 % with a standard deviation of
f4inter = 15.5 %. These values are in good agreement with both the simulation results and the
theoretical ideal value of 50 %, which shows that the PUF responses from different entities can
be distinguished.
5.4.2 Reproducibility Results
For the reproducibility evaluations, we operate four fabricated hybrid PUFs in the control-
led ambient environment of a climatic chamber. The test cases used for the experiments are
shown in Table 5.3, whereas test case %̃1 deenotes nominal operating conditions. The reason
for using four instead of all 15 fabricated PUF cores is the high complexity of the evaluati-
on process in terms of measurement equipment and time. We compute the reliability metric
according to Equation (2.12). The inverter biasing voltage is consecutively set to the values
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Figure 5.10: Inter-HD distribution for the responses of 15 fabricated hybrid PUFs generated under nominal condi-
tions (test case %̃1) as well as the simulation results for comparison (cf. [98]).
+in = {0.3 V, 0.4 V, 0.5 V}, to investigate the robustness around the best operating point de-
termined in our prior simulations (see Section 5.3). Figure 5.11a shows the mean reliability
values for each single tested PUF core. In this experiment, all test cases %̃1 to %̃11 are used. The
thick black line represents a second-order regression model fit of the calculated mean reliability
values. The maximum fitted mean reliability value is 78.5 % reached at +in = 0.4 V. However,
the simulations indicated a minimum reliability value of 93.7 %, which is far apart from the
experimental results. At this point we want to note that no passivation layer to protect the active
materials of the EGTs from environmental impacts is available for the fabricated devices. This
explains the relatively low experimental reliability values. To further investigate the impacts of
the different ambient conditions, we re-evaluate the reliability metric under non-consideration
of changes in the ambient temperature and relative humidity. Figure 5.11b shows the mean
reliability values for each PUF core based on the responses extracted under varied relative
humidity and supply voltages (test cases %̃1 to %̃5). The maximum mean reliability value is
92.3 % at +in = 0.5 V. The results show that the bit flips are mainly caused by the influence
of ambient temperatures variations. Figure 5.11c shows the mean reliability values for PUF
responses extracted under ambient temperature and supply voltage variations. The maximum
mean reliability value is 76.8 % at +in = 0.4 V, which is a further evidence for the temperature
dependency of the PUF responses. The actual bit errors over the inverter biasing voltage +in
and for different ambient temperatures are shown in Figure 5.11d. The relative humidity is 50 %
and the inverter supply voltage is VDDcore = 1.0 V. The inverter biasing voltage is gradually
increased in the range of +in = [0.0 V, 1.0 V]. For this evaluation, the reference responses are
generated for each temperature level in order to investigate the robustness of the PUF response
generation. The plot shows that the bit errors strongly increase between +in = [0.8 V, 1.0 V].
This effect happens because the PUF core inverters have already reached their logical low levels,
where the magnitude of the variations is small. If a single bit in a 28-bit response flips its binary
value, it causes a bit error of ≈ 3.6 %. The experimentally determined mean bit error is below
< 2 % for the full range of inverter biasing voltages, which means that in the average case less
than one bit is flipped per re-extraction of the PUF response.
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In summary, the results show that the bit errors are mainly caused by variations of the ambient
temperature. The impacts of altered relative humidity and inverter supply voltage variations are
low. Larger reliability values can be expected once passivation and encapsulation is available
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Figure 5.11: (a) Reliability values for ambient temperature, relative humidity, and supply voltage variations (test
cases %̃1 – %̃11). (b) Reliability values for relative humidity and supply voltage variations (test cases
%̃1 – %̃5). (c) Reliability values for ambient temperature and supply voltage variations (test cases %̃1,
%̃4 – %̃11). (d) Bit errors across different ambient temperatures (test cases %̃1, %̃6, and %̃9) (cf. [98]).
5.4.3 Bit Aliasing Results
To evaluate the bit aliasing metric, the responses of 15 fabricated hybrid PUFs are utilized.
The PUF responses are extracted under nominal operating conditions (test case %̃1). The in-
verter biasing voltage is fixed to the best operating point at +in = 0.4 V. Figure 5.12 shows
the distribution of the bit aliasing values (according to Equation (2.13)), computed based on
experimental response data. The resulting experimental mean bit aliasing value is `4BA = 44.5 %
with a standard deviation of f4BA = 9.3 %. The ideal bit aliasing value is 50 %, which shows that
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the PUF responses are biased towards 0. Nonetheless, the results show good statistical coverage
with the simulations (see Section 5.3).
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Figure 5.12: Bit aliasing at +in = 0.4 V and nominal operating conditions (test case %̃1) (cf. [98]).
5.4.4 Uniformity Results
Similar to the bit aliasing metric, the uniformity metric is computed based on PUF responses
generated from 15 fabricated hybrid PUFs. The hybrid PUFs are operated under nominal condi-
tions (test case %̃1) and the inverter biasing voltage is set to the best operating point +in = 0.4 V.
The resulting experimental mean uniformity is 44.5 %. The minimum and maximum values
are 17.9 % and 89.3 %, respectively, which denotes that some PUF responses are non-uniform.
The boxplot in Figure 5.13 shows the spread of the uniformity values. The results on the raw
PUF responses without additional post-processing imply that the hybrid PUF is not suitable for


























In general, the identification capabilities of PUFs are determined by the fuzziness of the PUF
responses. To determine a theoretical figure of merit in terms of the identification capabilities of
the hybrid PUF, we utilize the intra-HD and inter-HD distributions obtained from the simulations
in Section 5.3. In Section 3.2.3, we have introduced two challenge building methods. For our
first evaluations, we use the readdressing method to build the PUF challenges and generate the
corresponding responses from hybrid PUFs with eight core inverters.
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Figure 5.14: Intra-HD and inter-HD distributions based on simulations when using (a) the readdressing method and
(b) the differential addressing method to build the PUF challenges (cf. [216]).
Figure 5.14a shows the intra-HD (solid black line) and inter-HD (dash-dot red line) distributions
for the generated PUF responses. Both distributions are overlapping and enclose an area that is
divided by the dashed black line into the FAR (left) and FRR (right) regions.More information on
FAR and FRR can be found in Section 2.3.5. The FAR and FRR values are calculated according
to Equation (2.15) and Equation (2.16), respectively. Both values are dependent from the chosen
identification threshold thid. Typically, the threshold value is either set to the intersection point
of the intra-HD and inter-HD distributions or to the point where FAR=FRR, the so-called EER.
Firstly, we compute the FAR and FRR values for the intersection point thid = 14.29 % of
both distributions. The resulting values are FAR = 0.61 % (-2.21) and FRR = 0.21 % (-2.68).
The values in the brackets represent the log10(·) notation of the percentual values, which is
widely used to improve the readability and to ease comparability. Furthermore, we determine
the identification threshold thEER for the EER. The resulting values are thEER = 13.1 % and
FAR = FRR = 0.48 % (-2.32).
For the second evaluations, the differential addressing method is used to build the PUF challen-
ges. To obtain comparable 28-bit responses, we simulate hybrid PUFs with 56 core inverters.
Figure 5.14b shows the intra-HD (solid black line) and inter-HD (dash-dot blue line) distributions
for the generated PUF responses. For comparison purposes, the dash-dot red line indicates the
inter-HD distribution when using the readdressing method. The differential addressing method
leads to a reduced standard deviation of the inter-HD distribution, which is a consequence of
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the increased entropy of the PUF responses. For further evaluations on the PUF entropy, please
refer to Section 6.2.2. Since there is no visible overlap between both distributions, we set the
identification threshold to the value that leads to the EER. The resulting threshold value is
thEER = 17.08 % with FAR = FRR = 0.02 % (-3.61).
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Figure 5.15: Intra-HD and inter-HD distributions based on experimental data when using the readdressing method
for (a) raw PUF responses and (b) corrected PUF responses.
Figure 5.15a shows the intra-HD (solid black line) and inter-HD (dash-dot red line) distributions
based on the experimental responses of fabricated hybrid PUFs with eight core inverters. The
readdressing method is used for challenge building. Similar to our prior evaluations, we firstly
set the identification threshold to the intersection point of both distributions thid = 19.11 %. The
results are FAR = 0.59 % (-2.23) and FRR = 1.92 % (-1.71). The identification threshold value
that leads to the EER is thEER = 17.56 % with FAR = FRR = 1.50 % (-1.83).
The experimental results are in good agreement with the simulations in general. However, the
greater mean value of the intra-HDs moves the distribution to the right, which increases the
FAR and FRR areas. This can be attributed to the missing passivation layer for the fabricated
PUF core inverter’s EGTs. Due to the relatively low FAR and FRR values, the hybrid PUF is not
suitable for cryptographic applications, but qualifies for identification tasks. Nonetheless, the
relatively low design complexity and the non-linear bit width scaling property make the hybrid
PUF a promising candidate as a lightweight security primitive suitable for identification tasks.
Please note that the results for both, the simulations and the experimental data, are based on
raw PUF responses without additional post-processing, such as error-correction. Figure 5.15b
shows the intra-HD (solid black line) and inter-HD (dash-dot red line) distributions for PUF
responses that were post-processed by an exemplary 5-bit error-correction, based on Bose-
Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) codes. Figure 5.16 shows the response enrollment and the
response extraction phase including an error-correction.
Since the intra-HDvalues of various PUF responses are still greater than themaximumnumber of
bit errors that can be corrected by the BCH code, the area enclosed with the inter-HD distribution
does not decrease. This descriptive example shows that the error-correction must offer an upper
margin in terms of bits that can be corrected. Thereby, the identification threshold serves as the
lower boundary, indicating the minimum number of bits an error-correction must be capable
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to correct. For the fabricated hybrid PUF, the potential operational areas are limited to indoor




















Figure 5.16: Enrollment phase: Raw PUF response extraction '′ and syndrome computation by the error correc-
ting code (ECC). Extraction phase: Raw PUF response extraction '′ and error correction using the
syndrome to obtain the stable response '.
5.6 NIST Randomness Tests
To determine the randomness of the response bits generated by hybrid PUFs, we use the NIST-
STS. The NIST-STS defines various tests to assess the uniformity of the generated bits and
to find patterns in bit sequences. There are 15 tests specified in the NIST-STS to judge on
the randomness. For a comprehensive description of the single NIST tests please refer to the
NIST 800-22 specification in [217]. Since some NIST tests require a very large bit sequence,
our evaluation is limited to seven tests. For each test, a P-value is determined quantifying the
confidence in whether or not the null hypothesis, i.e., that the data is in fact random, is true [218].
This is the case if the P-value is greater than 0.01.
Table 5.5 shows the NIST test results for simulated hybrid PUFs using the differential addressing
method (refer to Section 3.2.3 for more information). The key length for performing the NIST
tests was set to 256 bits. The tested bit sequence comprises 31,976 bits generated by 1,142 hybrid
PUF entities. The results show, that the bit sequence generated by the hybrid PUFs satisfies the
NIST test requirements and are random.
Similarly, we have performedNIST tests by using the readdressingmethod for challenge building.
The tested bit sequence includes 224,000 bits generated by 8,000 hybrid PUF entities. In this
case, all tests failed, which means that the generated bit sequence is non-random. This can be
explained by the multiple reuse of inverter addresses, which degrades the entropy of the PUF
responses (please refer to Section 6.2.2 for a detailed discussion about entropy).
In summary, our NIST test evaluations show that the hybrid PUF is capable of producing
responses offering enough randomness as required in cryptography, if the differential addressing
method is used.
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(> 0.0001) (> 119)
Result
Frequency (Monobit) 0.141256 123/124 Pass
Block frequency 0.637119 124/124 Pass
Cumulative sums 0.407091 122/124 Pass
Runs 0.105618 121/124 Pass
Longest run of ones 0.941144 121/124 Pass
Approximate entropy 0.875539 124/124 Pass
Serial 0.033288 123/124 Pass
5.7 Performance Comparison of Different PUFs
To assess the performance of the silicon-based DiffC-PUF and the hybrid PUF incorporating
inkjet-printed PUF cores, we compare our results with other PUFs. Table 5.6 shows the per-
formance values of various PUFs based on silicon technology, novel materials, and printed
electronic components. It should be noted that this comparison only covers a selection of dif-
ferent PUF designs. The PUFs are assessed regarding their security metrics and identification
system capabilities. In general, most of the works in the literature either concentrate on the
security metrics or the PUF as part of an identification system. Most often it is not clear how
exactly the PUF responses were generated and whether additional post-processing techniques
or majority voting was used to stabilize the responses. Our evaluations are based on raw PUF
responses without any post-processing.
In the case of silicon-based PUFs, various works are available that show figures of merit for the
security metrics and the identification capabilities. The herein presented silicon-based DiffC-
PUF (see Section 4.2) achieves security metric results close to the ideal values. However, the
results regarding the identification capabilities do not reach the other PUFs’ performances. At
this point it must be considered that the silicon-based DiffC-PUF is a prototype system set up
with discrete components. Silicon-based PUFs do compete with sophisticated key generation
techniques, which are mainly based on well-recognized mathematical foundations and random
numbers. On the other hand, PUFs based on novel materials and printing technology are in
the very early stages. This makes it hard to compare the performance between the different
technologies for the time being.
In the context of PE-based PUFs, the organic RO-PUF presented by Kuribara et al. in [135] is
the first PUF that was suggested for PE fabrication. Their security metric evaluations are based
on manual frequency measurements of the ROs.
The first fully printed PUFs are based on memory cells. Firstly, the RFID SRAM-PUF was pro-
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posed without showing any PUF-specific performance results. The later on introduced memory-
based PUF’s security metrics are based on simulations, but serve as a performance indicator for
PE-based electrical PUFs. The herein presented hybrid PUF shows performance values in terms
of security metrics similar to the printed memory-based PUF. To the best of our knowledge, the
hybrid PUF is the first PE-based PUF that has been investigated regarding its securitymetrics and
identification capabilities. Therefore, the identification capabilities can not be stressed against
other related PUFs.
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have initially performed statistical analysis based on simulations to investigate
the characteristics of the inkjet-printed PUF cores. Monte Carlo (MC) simulations on printed in-
verters were performedwith varying parameters (see Table 5.1). The aim of the simulation-based
evaluations was to determine the best operating point of the hybrid PUF under consideration
of the security metrics including uniqueness, reproducibility, bit aliasing, and uniformity. The
results are close to the ideal values, showing that the hybrid PUF is a promising candidate for
being used as a security primitive. The best operating point in terms of robustness is reached
at a inverter biasing voltage of +in = 0.4 V. On that basis, we have performed statistical ana-
lysis on experimental response data obtained from 15 fabricated hybrid PUFs. The PUFs were
operated in a climatic chamber under controlled ambient conditions including temperature and
humidity variations (see Table 5.3 for the experiments). The calculated security metric values
for the uniqueness, bit aliasing, and uniformity show good agreement with the simulations.
The reproducibility, more particularly the mean reliability value is relatively low. This effect
mainly stems from the missing passivation and encapsulation of the printed transistors, which
can be improved in the future. Finally, we have investigated the identification capabilities of
the hybrid PUF based on simulations and raw experimental response data. The relatively low
FAR and FRR values show that the hybrid PUF is not suitable for cryptographic applications.
This is caused by the low reliability value. However, we want to note that the security metric
evaluations are based on raw response data without additional post-processing. The reliability
as well as the identification capabilities (FAR and FRR) can be expected better once passivation,
encapsulation, and error correction is available for the hybrid PUF. The results obtained from
NIST tests show, that the responses generated by the hybrid PUF are random and satisfy the
requirements to be suitable for cryptography, if the differential addressing method is used to
build the PUF challenges. Table 5.6 summarizes the most important results obtained from our
evaluations including a comparison with other works.
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6 Attacks Against PUFs
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, we focused on the design, simulation, fabrication, and evaluation of
PUFs. From the outside point of view, a PUF is a black box that is stimulated with an input
(challenge) and replies with an output (response). The internal device-specific characteristics
are hidden and seem to be unpredictable. However, non-idealities such as systematic variations
might cause correlations between CRPs, which are actually expected to be independent. This
circumstance opens doors for attackers whose aim is to create a clone that behaves like the
original PUF. As discussed in Section 2.6, for an attacker it is of substantial importance to
leak CRPs from the PUF in order to draw conclusions about the challenge-response behavior.
The procedure of leaking CRPs is also referred to as eavesdropping attacks and is extensively
discussed in Section 2.6.2. Many works dealing with attacks on PUFs can be found in the
literature [104, 114, 118, 221, 222]. Most of them concentrate on strong PUFs that exhibit large
CRP spaces, where the challenge-response interfaces are typically publicly accessible. Up to
now, there are no works addressing attacks on PE-based PUFs. In this chapter, we aim to:
• Give a detailed security analysis on the herein presented PUF design with special emphasis
on the PE-based hybrid PUF. The analysis will also include entropy and bias investigations
of the PUF responses.
• Introduce a sorting algorithm that can be used to model the challenge-response behavior
of the PUF. This analysis will also include performance results in terms of prediction
accuracy.
• Perform model-based attacks by means of supervised machine learning algorithms and
evaluate the performances of the different models.
• Compare and discuss the performance of the sorting algorithms and the employedmachine
learning algorithms.
6.2 Security Analysis
6.2.1 Security Challenges for PE-Based PUFs
Silicon-based PUFs are typically fabricated as encapsulated multi-layer integrated circuits (ICs).
The packaged design makes it difficult and therefore expensive for attackers to eavesdrop CRPs,
since invasive attacks are required to get access to the internal wirings. As a consequence,
attackers are often limited to semi-invasive and non-invasive attacks, especially if there is no
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physical access to the PUF. For example, strong PUFs are often used for device authentication,
where each CRP is just used once in the lifetime of the device. Theoretically, there is no need
to encrypt the challenge and the resulting response data between the PUF-equipped device and
the authentication party. Simple and low-cost non-invasive attacks are sufficient to eavesdrop
the communication. The attacker might draw conclusions about the challenge-response behavior
of the PUF and try to derive/predict other CRPs. This would only be possible if there were
dependencies between the CRPs. In this context, the entropy and the bias of the PUF responses
are important measures to assess the learnability.
Contrary to silicon technology, which offers high integration densities, PE enables large-area
fabrication. Printed electronic systems include large-area structures, e.g. in the form of bonding
pads and/or wires visible with the naked eye. As a consequence, they can be accessed with
little effort, e.g. with standard measurement probes, which implies that there is an aggravated
risk against invasive eavesdropping attacks. Figure 6.1a shows the microscope image of a wire
and bonding pad on an ITO substrate structured via laser ablation. The substrate hosts the





Figure 6.1: (a) Microscope image of a wire and bonding pad on an ITO substrate structured via laser ablation. The
substrate hosts the inkjet-printed electronic, which is connected to a PCB using conductive adhesive.
(b) Microscope image of an inkjet-printed single-bit memory-based PUF circuit © 2018 IEEE [125].
The herein presented DiffC-PUF design belongs to the group of weak PUFs. As described in
Section 2.6.3, weak PUFs are often used in a controlled PUF environment to obfuscate the
challenge and response interfaces. However, weak PUFs can exceed hundreds or even thousands
of CRPs, making them also candidates for being attacked and cloned [223]. This is an important
information since all yet introduced PE-based PUF designs are weak PUFs. The reason behind is
that PE technology faces limitations in terms of yield and integration density. Figure 6.1b shows
the image of an inkjet-printed single-bit memory-based PUF circuit [125]. The dimensions
of the pads and wirings are magnitudes larger than comparable widths used in silicon-based
technology.
Furthermore, additive manufacturing capabilities can be used to tune [224] or manipulate the
characteristics of printed circuits. This must be considered when integrating printed electronic
devices into products. Possible countermeasures are protective coatings to detect invasive attacks.
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6.2.2 Entropy of PUF Responses
To assess the entropy of responses produced by the hybrid PUF, the normalized entropy [ is
calculated according to Equation (2.5). Since the challenge building method has direct impacts
on the entropy determination, we distinguish between the readdressing and the differential
addressing methods (please refer to Section 3.2.3 for more information on the challenge building
techniques).
Challenge Building Method 1: Readdressing
In the readdressing method (see Section 3.2.3 for more information), the alphabet consists of the
" inverter addresses and is defined as / = {I0, . . . , I"−1}. The number of symbols is |/ | = " .
For our entropy estimation, we use a challenge that leads to the maximum response bit width
!max. Since each sub-challenge includes two inverter addresses, the total number of symbols to
be considered is # = 2 · !max. Each inverter address occurs exactly " − 1 times in a challenge,
which implies that the probabilities of occurrence are equally distributed over all symbols. The
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Figure 6.2: Normalized entropy as defined by Shannon (solid black line) and maximum response bit width using
the readdressing method (dashed blue line).
The solid black line in Figure 6.2 shows the normalized entropy for different numbers of PUF
core inverters ("). If " is increased, the normalized entropy decreases slightly. In general,
the curve shows that the entropy of the PUF responses is reduced to nearly 50 %. The reason
behind is the readdressingmethod used for challenge building. The results show, that correlations
between the sub-challenges do exist and that the PUF is vulnerable against model-based attacks.
For " = 8 PUF core inverters, the normalized entropy is [ = 0.517. The dashed blue line
shows the maximum response bit width !max that can be achieved with a specific number
of PUF core inverters. The previously shown results on the entropy estimation for the PUF
responses originated from the employed challenge building method. The obtained theoretical
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entropy values do not consider the statistical characteristics of the PUF responses. Therefore, we
compute theminimum entropy (min-entropy) to determine the lower bound of unpredictability of
the responses. The mean bit aliasing value (Equation (2.13)) gives the bias of the PUF responses.
On the basis of our simulation results from Section 5.3.4, we get the probabilities of occurrence
?0 = 0.502 and ?1 = 0.498. Correspondingly, the maximum probability is ?max = 0.502. The
resulting min-entropy value of the PUF responses is min = 0.994.
Challenge Building Method 2: Differential Addressing
As described in Section 3.2.3, in the differential addressing method each inverter address is just
used once among all challenges. In this case, the alphabet also consists of " inverter addresses
and is defined as / = {I0, . . . , I"−1}, whereas the number of symbols is |/ | = " . To estimate
the entropy we use a challenge that leads to the maximum response bit width, which is defined
as !max = "/2. Since each inverter address is used exactly once, the probability of occurrence





The resulting entropy value is 1, which is obvious since all challenges are completely inde-
pendent. To estimate the min-entropy for the differential addressing method, we simulate 1,000
hybrid PUFs. To be able to compare the PUF responses, we increase the number of PUF core
inverters to " = 56, which leads to a maximum response bit width of !max = 28. Figure 6.3
shows the distribution of the resulting bit aliasing values. The mean bit aliasing value is 49.7 %,
which leads to the probabilities of occurrence ?0 = 0.503 and ?1 = 0.497. The resulting maxi-
mum probability is ?max = 0.503 and causes a min-entropy value of min = 0.991. Table 6.1
shows the entropy results for the silicon-based DiffC-PUF and the PE-based hybrid PUF.
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Figure 6.3: Bit aliasing for a hybrid PUF when using the differential addressing method for challenge building.
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Table 6.1: Comparison of the Shannon entropy and min-entropy values.
Addressing Inverters Entropy




DiffC-PUF★ Experimental Readdressing 8 45.6 % 0.517 0.878
Hybrid PUF† Simulation Readdressing 8 49.8 % 0.517 0.994
Simulation Differential 56 49.7 % 1 0.991
Experimental Readdressing 8 44.5 % 0.517 0.849
Note: ★Silicon-based PUF. †Printed/Hybrid PUF.
6.3 PUF Attack Methodology
In this section, we introduce the attack methodology that is used for the further evaluations. We
distinguish between the enrollment phase and the model-based attack phase. In the former, the
CRP data is generated from the original PUFs and stored in a database. In the attack phase, the
CRP data is prepared as required by the employed models. In Section 2.6.3, we have reviewed
various model-based attacking methods. The herein employed techniques are based on sorting
and machine learning. To simulate the effects of fuzzy PUF responses or noisy eavesdropping
channels, we artificially introduce bit error-inflicted CRPs by randomly flipping response bits.
On that basis, PUF responses are predicted using the trained model. To assess the prediction
capabilities, various performancemetrics are computed and compared against each other.Model-
based training techniques mainly depend on the quality and quantity of the training data.
Performing model-based attacks on hybrid PUFs (with " = 8 PUF core inverters) and a
maximum single response bit width of 28-bit would be non-productive. To provide meaningful
statistics we increase the number of PUF core inverter to " = 64, which leads to the maximum
number of 2,016 sub-CRPs. According to Equation (3.3), in total 2,016 sub-challenges and
sub-responses can be generated with this configuration and with the readdressing method. In
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r0 r1 ... rk ... rK-1
Data preparation
Model training /  sorting r′0 r′1 ... r′k ... r′K-1
LR MLPRF
c′k
Figure 6.4: Methodology for our model-based attack evaluations. In the data preparation building block, the raw
extracted PUF challenge-response data is encoded into the representation that fits the model best.
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Raw Training Data
PUF responses extracted from the original PUFs without additional post-processing are called
raw responses. In this context, the term raw training data refers to CRPs that comprise one
sub-challenge 2: and the corresponding genuine sub-response bit A: , as shown in Figure 6.4.
Error-Inflicted Training Data
Attackers might sometimes face eavesdropping errors due to environmental impacts, such as
noise or fuzzy responses. To assess the prediction performance of the employed model-based
attacks, we deliberately introduce error-inflicted sub-CRPs. In particular, randomly selected
response bits are flipped in the training data. For the further evaluations, we run experiments
with bit error rates (BERs) of 10 % and 20 %. At this point we want to note that the herein
considered BER is an independent probability per sub-response bit. This assumption is helpful
for the statistical evaluation and assessment of the learning capabilities of the employed model-
based cloning techniques, but does not reflect the real situation an attacker might be exposed
to.
6.4 Sorting Attacks
6.4.1 Binary Relations Sorting Algorithm
In general, with the readdressing method to build PUF challenges, the DiffC-PUF design is
comparable with the ring oscillator selection in RO-PUFs [110]. The RO-PUF design has been
demonstrated to be vulnerable against machine learning attacks by Ruehrmair et al. [114].
Moreover, the authors stated that sorting attacks can also be used to estimate the internal
oscillating frequency order of the ROs. In this section, we introduce an online sorting algorithm
that is capable of modeling hybrid PUFs.
In the following we assume that an attacker is able to eavesdrop sub-challenges and sub-
responses from the hybrid PUF. The combination of both is called sub-CRP comprising the
tuple (0: , 1: , A: ), where 0: and 1: are two PUF core inverter addresses and A: is the sub-
response bit. It is assumed that the exact inverter output voltages are not known by the attacker.
However, each sub-CRP represents a mathematical binary relation in the form of Equation (6.3).
2: = (0: , 1: )
{
+out(0: ) > +out(1: ), if A: = 1
+out(0: ) < +out(1: ), if A: = 0
(6.3)
The transitivity of these binary relations can be used to create a sorted list of the relative
PUF core inverter output voltages. It is assumed that in a real attack scenario the adversary
is limited to passive eavesdropping and can not select the sub-challenges arbitrarily. Thereby,
the eavesdropped sub-CRPs drop in an uncontrolled manner, which raises the need for direct
processing of the binary relations into model training. Online sorting algorithms are promising
that can process input elements provided piece-by-piece by keeping the sequence sorted as more
elements are added. The insertion sort algorithm [225] offers online functionality and can sort
lists as it receives the elements.
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We introduce the binary relations sort (BR-sort) algorithm, which uses insertion sort as the core
sorting algorithm. For each PUF core inverter address, we store a list of all occurring binary
relations with other inverter addresses. This enables to sort the inverter addresses regarding their
inverter output voltages. Figure 6.7 shows the flowchart of the function INSERT_CRP(·) to add
sub-CRPs to the sorted inverter address list (. The globally defined list ( is built up line-by-line
and holds the current set of already inserted inverter addresses in ascending order. Please note
that the algorithm sorts the inverter addresses based on binary relations, more particularly the
relative inverter output voltages. This means that the inverter addresses themselves are typically
not arranged in ascending order in the sorted list (. Each time a sub-CRP is added to the sorted
list, the function BR_UPDATE(·) is called, which keeps track of all binary relations that have
already been inserted. The flowchart in Figure 6.8 shows the function BR_SORT(·) to sort on
the basis of binary relations.
In a real attack scenario, the adversary might eavesdrop faulty sub-CRPs due to noisy side-
channels. Faulty sub-CRPs would lead to contradictions in the sorting algorithm. For the attacker
it would be hard to detect it if a contradiction was caused by the last recently inserted sub-CRP
or if the corrupted sub-CRP was already part of the binary relations list. To improve the
sorting quality, our algorithm tries to reduce the impact of corrupted sub-CRPs. For example,
if (0: , 1: , 1) → +out(0: ) > +out(1: ) causes a contradiction with the current binary relations list
', then our algorithm checks whether 1: can be moved into the opposite direction towards 0: .
This approach triggers a further update of the ' list, which improves the consistency of the
sorted inverter address list (. Since the proposed binary relation sorting algorithm is based on
the insertion sort algorithm, the worst case runtime complexity is O(=2).
6.4.2 Performance Results
To assess the performance of the proposed BR-sort algorithm, the accuracy of its PUF response
prediction capabilities is computed. The predictions are made on the basis of the sorted PUF
core inverter address list. The prediction accuracy is computed according to Equation (2.19).
Therefore, the predicted PUF responses are classified into the number of TP, TN, FP, and FN, as
introduced in Section 2.6.5. In this respect, the attack methodology introduced in Section 6.3 is
used with the CRPs of 1,000 simulated hybrid PUFs. The hybrid PUFs are set up with " = 64
PUF core inverters. The heatmap in Figure 6.5a shows one example output of a hybrid PUF
with " = 64 PUF core inverters visualized by an 8 × 8 array. The numbers denote the inverter
address, whereas the colors indicate the corresponding inverter output voltage. Figure 6.5b and
Figure 6.5c show the sorted list ( after using 30 % and 90 % of the sub-CRPs as training data.
When initializing theBR-sort algorithm, the sorted inverter address list ( is empty and growswith
new binary relations of sub-CRPs. If the number of sub-CRPs eavesdropped by an attacker is low
enough, some of the PUF core inverter addresses might not be part of the sorted list (. Missing
inverter addresses can not be resolved and may cause wrong predictions. One possible solution
to overcome this issue is to preinitialize the sorted list ( randomly with the number of inverter
addresses. This is only applicable if the attacker knows about the hybrid PUF architecture. For
our evaluations, we distinguish between the following two methods to start sorting with:
• Initialization method 1: Empty list (.
• Initialization method 2: Preinitialized list (.
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57 28 17 0 40 1 41 59
11 38 32 3 47 60 31 18
37 5 52 14 55 54 29 39
30 22 16 36 43 62 35 44
58 15 21 12 24 13 26 56
63 23 50 8 27 53 48 19
25 20 45 61 42 49 7 10
46 6 51 33 34 4 9 2
Sorted list for 30 % training data
(b)
0 57 28 17 40 1 32 41
5 59 47 60 52 38 11 3
18 54 31 37 30 16 14 55
29 43 44 36 39 13 21 62
15 22 27 26 63 58 56 23
50 24 12 53 20 46 8 35
45 48 42 19 61 7 10 51
33 25 34 4 6 49 9 2
Sorted list for 90 % training data
(c)
Figure 6.5: Heatmaps showing the simulated inverter output voltage variations of a hybrid PUF with 64 core
inverters. The colors indicate the inverter output voltages, whereas the numbers show the corresponding
inverter address. (a) Heatmap of the actual PUF inverter output voltages. (b) Heatmap of the sorted list
with 30 % training data. (c) Heatmap of the sorted list with 90 % training data.
Furthermore, we distinguish between error-free (raw) and error-inflicted training data, as descri-
bed in Section 6.3. Please consider that we use the term training data synonymously to describe
the insertion of sub-CRPs in the BR-sort algorithm. The prediction accuracies are calculated
for different ratios of training and test data sizes (@train/@test). The training data comprises the
sub-CRPs of 1,000 simulated hybrid PUFs. For model training using the BR-sort algorithm, the
sub-CRPs are randomly chosen in the range of @train = [10 %, 90 %] with steps of 5 %.
Raw Training Data
Figure 6.6a shows the prediction accuracy values. The orange line indicates the results if sorting
starts with an empty list ( (method 1). The green line shows the results in case of a start with a
preinitialized list (method 2). The markers represent the mean accuracy values, whereas the error
bars indicate the standard deviations. The numbers below the error bars display the predictions
failed due to too small training data @train. In these cases, not all inverter addresses have already
been present in the sorted list (. In contrast, the results when preinitializing the list ( are slightly
better for small training set sizes @train = [10 %, 20 %]. From an attackers point of view, in the
best case unknown sub-CRPs can be predicted with an accuracy of ≥ 90 %, if at least 25 % of
the total sub-CRPs were eavesdropped and used for model training.
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10 % bit errors in training responses
20 % bit errors in training responses
(b)
Figure 6.6: Prediction accuracies of the proposed binary relation sorting algorithm for (a) raw training data and (b)
error-inflicted training data.
Error-Inflicted Training Data
To assess the prediction performance of the BR-sort algorithm under the impact of error-inflicted
training data, we deliberately flip the response bits of sub-CRPs. Similar to the prior evaluations
on raw response data, we choose the sub-CRPs randomly in the range of @train. Figure 6.6b
shows the prediction accuracies for BERs of 10 % and 20 %. The results show that the prediction
performance of the BR-sort algorithm decreases if bit errors occur in the training data. Table 6.2
shows the obtained best, median, and mean prediction accuracy values for different BERs. The
table shows the percentual training data required for model training to achieve a prediction
accuracy of ≥ 90 %. Table 6.3 shows the detailed results for the quality metrics. If increasing
the BER, the TP and TN values decrease, while the FP and FN values increase. This causes the
classification accuracy (see Equation (2.19)) to decrease.
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6 Attacks Against PUFs
6.5 Machine Learning Attacks
6.5.1 Data Preparation
In general, machine learning algorithms use inputs to create outputs. The input data must be
prepared in a form that is compatible with the requirements of the ML methods. This data
preparation procedure is called feature engineering and can also improve the performance
of the prediction accuracies. In the following, we describe the binary and one-hot encoding
representation of numbers in general and hybrid PUF sub-challenges in particular. As introduced
in Section 3.2.3, each sub-challenge comprises the tuple 2: = (0: , 1: ), where 0: and 1:
are PUF core inverter addresses. Typically, these addresses are displayed in integer or binary
representation to improve human readability. Using the binary encoding directly as inputs for
the ML models causes that a natural ordering between the categories (in this case the inverter
addresses) is assumed. However, this is not the desired behavior of the ML models, since
the inverter output voltages are completely independent from the actual inverter address. For
example, in the case of the three inverter addresses 00 = 1, 01 = 2, and 02 = 3 the ML model
would think that 00 = 1 is more similar to 01 = 2 than to 02 = 3 due to the smaller difference. In
this context, the one-hot encoding is widely used in ML to circumvent such effects [226, 227].
For our further evaluations, we choose the one-hot encoding representation, which is widely
used for representing categorical data.
Binary Representation



















∈ {0, 1}). As a result, each sub-challenge














where 08: ≠ 1
8
: (0 ≤ 8 ≤ 9 − 1) and 9 = log2(").
One-Hot Encoding Representation
One-hot encoded bit strings exhibit exactly one 1, whereas all other bit values are 0. As a
consequence, the minimum bit width of one-hot encoded bit strings equals the number of
different classes to be distinguished. In the case of the hybrid PUF, each binary 9-bit inverter
address is converted to its "-bit one-hot representation using the mapping function 5one−hot
from Equation (6.5):
5one−hot : {0, 1} 9 → {0, 1}" . (6.5)




. . . 0
9−1
:





. . . ¤0"−1
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. . . ¤1"−1
:
. Each sub-
challenge only includes two single bits with the binary values of 1, which determine the two
inverter addresses. This means that only these two sub-challenge addresses are considered by
the ML algorithm, which makes the learning more efficient.
96
6.5 Machine Learning Attacks
In general, the challenge-response behavior of theMLmodels can be expressed as 5model : ′ → '′,
where '′ = {0, 1} and ′
 
= {0, 1} denotes the set of all  sub-challenges 2′
:
. Equation (6.6)
and Equation (6.7) show the (predicted) sub-response A′
:
as a function of the sub-challenge using























: . . .
¤1"−1: ). (6.7)
6.5.2 Employed Machine Learning Algorithms
The LR, RF, and MLP classifiers are interesting machine learning techniques to model complex
behavior. These techniques have been demonstrated in the literature to effectivelymodel different
types of PUFs. In the following, we describe the configuration used for ourML-based attacks. For
our implementations of the ML algorithms we use the Python-based scikit-learn library [228].
Please refer to Section 2.6.4 for more basic information on the employed ML algorithms.
Logistic Regression (LR) Configuration
Tomodel the challenge-response behavior of hybrid PUFs, we employ the LR algorithm using the
limited-memory Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (L-BFGS) optimization algorithm [229],
due to its fault tolerance in step size control.
Random Forest (RF) Configuration
For our evaluations with the RF algorithm, we use ten decision trees to model the hybrid PUF’s
challenge-response behavior.
Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) Configuration
Figure 6.9 shows the MLP architecture used to model hybrid PUFs with 64 PUF core inverters.
The MLP is set up with two hidden layers comprising 128 and 64 perceptrons. We use 128
perceptrons in the first hidden layer, since the one-hot encoded challenges comprise 128 bits.
The output layer is a single perceptron. We use the sigmoid (logistic) activation function for
the perceptrons and the gradient-based adaptive moment estimation (Adam) [230] optimization
algorithm to optimize the edge weights and perceptron biases.
6.5.3 Performance Results
To assess the performance of the employed ML algorithms, the prediction accuracy and the
quality of the classification is computed according to Equation (2.19). In this regard, the TP,
TN, FP, and FN values are calculated according to Section 2.6.5. To assess the quality of the
classification, the ROC curves and AUROC values are computed for each ML algorithm. The
attack methodology depicted in Figure 6.4 is used to perform the model-based attacks. In total,
the CRPs of 1,000 simulated hybrid PUFs with" = 64 PUF core inverters provide the data basis
for our evaluations. The performance of the ML algorithms is evaluated for different ratios of
training and test data sizes (@train/@test). The training data comprises randomly chosen sub-CRPs
in the range of @train = [10 %, 90 %] in steps of 5 %.
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Figure 6.9: Multi-layer perceptron (MLP) architecture.
Raw Training Data
Figure 6.10a shows the classification accuracies of the three employed ML algorithms. The
markers represent the mean values, whereas the error bars indicate the standard deviations
of the corresponding data points. The MLP (red line and point markers) classifier shows the
best classification performance and reaches mean accuracies of ≥ 90 % when being trained
with @train = 25 % of the sub-CRPs of a hybrid PUF. The LR (blue line and triangle markers)
algorithm requires at least @train = 35 % of the sub-CRPs to break through this line. Finally,
the RF (green line and square markers) shows the lowest performance in terms of classification
accuracies. The results show, that the hybrid PUFs can be successfully modeled by attackers
if using the readdressing method to build PUF challenges. This is in good agreement with our
entropy analysis in Section 6.2.2.
To assess the quality of the classification we compute the true-positive-rate (TPR) and the
false positive rate (FPR) according to Equation (2.20) and Equation (2.21), respectively. From
an attackers point of view, it is desired to use the model-based attack that offers the best
classification quality while requiring the least training data. From our prior evaluations on the
prediction accuracies, we determined the MLP as the best predictive model. Therefore, we
use the MLP model as the benchmark for our classification quality assessment. Figure 6.10b
shows the ROC curves for the LR, RF, and MLP classifiers when training the ML models with
@train = 25 % of the total sub-CRPs. All AUROC values are close to the ideal value of 1, which
implies that the classification of the ML models is accurate.
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Training data: 25 %
Raw training data
LR (AUROC = 0.96)
RF (AUROC = 0.93)
MLP (AUROC = 0.98)
(b)
Figure 6.10: (a) Prediction accuracies of the LR, RF, and MLP machine learning methods for raw training data.
(b) ROC curves for the LR, RF, and MLP machine learning methods for raw training data.
Error-Inflicted Training Data
To simulate the effects of noisy side-channels, we randomly flip response bits of the sub-CRPs
used as training data. Figure 6.11a shows the prediction accuracies for the three employed ML
algorithms after introducing BERs of 10 % (dashed lines) and 20 % (dotted lines), respectively.
The results show, that increasing bit errors reduce the prediction accuracies. The MLP and LR
classifiers achieve similar results and reach mean accuracies of ≥ 90 %, if at least @train = 70 %
of the sub-CRPs are used for model training. The following correlation can be seen: The greater
the BER, the smaller the gap between theMLP and LR accuracies. In this case, the lower training
complexity in terms of computing power and time consumption makes the LR algorithm the
most appropriate choice for attackers. Analog to our evaluation results based on raw training
data, the RF classifier shows worse performance. Table 6.2 shows the obtained best, median,
and mean prediction accuracies for different BERs. Furthermore, the table shows the relative
training data required (@train/@test) to achieve a mean prediction accuracy of ≥ 90 %.
Similar to our evaluations based on the raw training data, we plot the ROC curves for the ML
classifiers for error-inflicted training data. Figure 6.11b and Figure 6.11c show the resulting ROC
curves when using @train = 25 % training data. Even if increasing the BER in the training data,
the LR and MLP models outperform the RF classifier. Although the AUROC values decrease,
the distance between the ROC curves and the diagonal black dashed line is still large, which
implies accurate predictive models. Table 6.3 shows the detailed results for the quality metrics.
6.6 Performance Comparison
In the previous sections, we have performed model-based attacks on hybrid PUFs, using the BR-
sort algorithm aswell as differentmachine learning techniques.When using the raw training data,
our evaluation results show that the BR-sort algorithm reaches prediction accuracies similar to
the MLP classifier. If we consider the mean training times required by both models, the sorting
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Training data: 25 %
Error-inflicted training data: 20 %
LR (AUROC = 0.89)
RF (AUROC = 0.81)
MLP (AUROC = 0.87)
(c)
Figure 6.11: (a) Mean prediction accuracies of the LR, RF, and MLP machine learning methods for error-inflicted
training data. ROC curves for the LR, RF, and MLP machine leaning methods for error-inflicted
training data with bit errors rates (BERs) of (b) 10 %, and (c) 20 %.
algorithm offers ≈ 428-times faster training. This makes the BR-sort algorithm a promising
alternative to the MLP classifier. The LR models’ mean training time is in the range of the BR-
sort algorithm. However, the minimum training data required to achieve prediction accuracies
of ≥ 90 % is at @train = 35 %, which is 10 % higher than for the BR-sort and MLP models. This
means additional efforts for attackers in terms of eavesdropping CRP data. The RF classifier
is outperformed by all other model-based attacks. If introducing bit errors to the training data,
the performance of the BR-sort algorithm reduces strongly. The results imply that the ML
classifiers should be preferred by attackers to attain high predictive models. Table 6.4 compares
different works on model-based PUF attacks that can be found in the literature. Compared to
other PUF types, the hybrid PUF design is less vulnerable against model-based attacks. This
can be explained by the architecture of the hybrid PUF, where inverter cells can be addressed
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arbitrarily. In contrast, in arbiter PUFs each challenge involves all PUF logic components, which
reveals information about the internal characteristics of the entire PUF circuit.
Table 6.2: Comparison of the prediction accuracy values of the BR-sort algorithm and different machine learning
methods. The training data indicates the minimum relative portion of the total sub-CRPs required for
model training to achieve a mean prediction accuracy score of ≥ 90 %.
Learning Training Accuracy Error-infliction (BER) Training
method data score 0 % 10 % 20 % time
Best 95.6 % 89.9 % 81.1 %
BR-sort
Median 91.8 % 79.1 % 70.5 %
(method 1)
30 %
Mean 91.6 % 79.1 % 70.4 %
14.2 ms
Best 94.7 % 88.5 % 81.7 %
BR-sort
Median 90.4 % 79.6 % 70.9 %
(method 2)
25 %
Mean 90.3 % 79.2 % 70.7 %
12.4 ms
Best 94.5 % 91.4 % 85.4 %
Median 90.2 % 85.8 % 80.4 %LR 35 %
Mean 90.1 % 85.8 % 80.4 %
13.7 ms
Best 95.5 % 93.6 % 90.6 %
Median 88.6 % 86.1 % 81.7 %RF 90 %
Mean 88.4 % 86.2 % 81.8 %
16.4 ms
Best 94.8 % 88.6 % 82.7 %
Median 91.0 % 82.4 % 76.4 %MLP 25 %
Mean 90.1 % 82.4 % 76.3 %
5.3 s
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Table 6.3: Quality metrics of the classification for the BR-sort algorithm as well as the LR, RF, and MLP classifiers
based on raw and error-inflicted training data. The training data indicates the minimum relative portion
of the total sub-CRPs required for model training to achieve a mean prediction accuracy score of ≥ 90 %.
Learning Training Confusion Error-infliction (BER)
method data matrix term 0 % 10 % 20 %
TP 45.8 % 39.8 % 35.2 %
TN 46.4 % 40.3 % 36.1 %BR-sort
FP 3.6 % 9.7 % 13.9 %(method 1)
30 %
FN 4.2 % 10.2 % 14.8 %
TP 44.8 % 39.2 % 35.1 %
TN 45.4 % 39.9 % 35.9 %BR-sort
FP 4.6 % 10.1 % 14.1 %(method 2)
25 %
FN 5.2 % 10.8 % 14.9 %
TP 45.1 % 42.9 % 40.2 %
TN 45.1 % 42.9 % 40.3 %
FP 4.9 % 7.1 % 9.7 %
LR 35 %
FN 4.9 % 7.1 % 9.8 %
TP 43.2 % 41.8 % 39.0 %
TN 45.3 % 44.4 % 43.0 %
FP 4.6 % 5.4 % 6.8 %
RF 90 %
FN 6.9 % 8.4 % 11.2 %
TP 45.5 % 41.1 % 38.1 %
TN 45.5 % 41.3 % 38.2 %
FP 4.5 % 8.7 % 11.8 %
MLP 25 %
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6.7 Conclusion
The security level of PUFs is mainly dependent on the vulnerabilities against physical and
mathematical cloning. In this chapter, we have investigated and discussed the vulnerabilities
of the hybrid PUF against model-based attacks. From an attacker’s point of view, the internal
characteristics of a PUF are not visible and appear to be totally random. However, all PUFs are
subject to limited one-wayness, e.g. caused by systematic variations that lead to interdependen-
cies between CRPs, biased responses, and reduced entropy. In this chapter, we have discussed
eavesdropping techniques to leak CRPs and uncover correlations using model-based attacks.
At this point we want to note, that PE-based PUFs face special security challenges due to the
relatively low printing resolutions, large structures and components. Furthermore, we have per-
formed entropy analysis based on different challenge building methods as well as minimum
entropy (min-entropy) estimations. The results are shown in Table 6.1 and imply that the PUF
response entropy mainly depends on the employed challenge building method. Having a reduced
entropy implies that the interdependencies between the CRPs can be utilized to predict others.
While most of the state of the art model-based attacks are solely based on machine learning
algorithms, we have introduced a sorting algorithm to model the internal behavior of hybrid
PUFs (and RO-PUFs). Furthermore, we have employed the logistic regression (LR), random
forest (RF), and multi-layer perceptron (MLP) classifiers to model hybrid PUFs. To assess and
compare their performances in terms of prediction accuracies, an evaluation methodology was
presented. The results (see Table 6.2 and Table 6.3) show, that the hybrid PUF is vulnerable
against model-based attacks. Nonetheless, it is less vulnerable than many other PUF types (see
Table 6.4). The sorting algorithm benefits from shorter training times compared to the ML
algorithms. However, if the eavesdropped CRPs are erroneous, the ML techniques outperform
the sorting algorithm.
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7.1 Conclusion
Printed electronics (PE) is a young research field compared to conventional silicon-based elec-
tronics and is considered as a key enabler for the Internet of Everything (IoE). A variety of novel
materials and new fabrication methods enable flexible substrates, new form factors, large-area
fabrication, and decentralized manufacturing.
These unique features bring new device types and develops new markets. In the scope of the
IoE, devices are interconnected and managed in networks. The heterogeneity of devices with
diverse computing performance and design constraints raise challenges in terms of security. In
this context, constrained lightweight devices and systems are especially threatened.
To overcome these issues and to provide security also for low-complexity PE-based devices and
systems, hardware-intrinsic security is a promising research direction. In this context, physically
unclonable functions (PUFs) enable trust in the context of key derivation, generation, and secure
storage. Firstly introduced for silicon technology to enable root of trust and to provide a device-
specific inherent source of randomness for key derivation, the research field of printed PUFs is
in the very early days. This thesis deals with PUFs based on hybrid electronics and has provided
the following scientific contributions, in particular: (1) Determination of hardware-intrinsic se-
curity, particularly PUFs, as promising security primitives to be utilized in lightweight PE-based
devices and systems. (2) Investigation of the requirements on PUF designs to meet the criteria
of PE technology. Development of concepts for a PE-based PUF comprising silicon-based and
printed components. (3) Implementation and evaluation of an embedded evaluation platform
to enable large-scale characterization for fabricated silicon-based and PE-based PUFs. (4) Im-
plementation of a simulation environment to investigate and evaluate the security metrics of
the PE-based PUF. (5) Fabrication of PE-based PUFs and evaluation of the security metrics.
(6) Determination of potential security threats arising for PE-based PUFs and investigation of
vulnerabilities. Finally, (7) Implementation and evaluation of attacks against the introduced PE-
based PUF and determination of potential target applications. The research questions outlined
in Chapter 1 have been answered in the following way:
• Q1:Which state of the art approaches are best suited to provide security features for
PE-based devices and systems?
Printed electronics is a key enabling technology for the IoE. The pervasive interconnec-
tion of devices and the deployment in untrusted environments strengthen the need for
security solutions suitable for lightweight electronic systems. The relatively strict design
and performance constraints provided by PE limits the applicability of conventional secu-
rity approaches. Originally emerged from silicon technology, hardware-intrinsic security,
particularly PUFs, make use of the random intrinsic variations of integrated circuits and
components to reproducibly derive device-specific identifiers. In Chapter 2 of this the-
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sis, a comprehensive overview of state of the art PUF types is given. Firstly introducing
silicon-based PUFs, the literature review also includes PUFs based on PE technology
and novel materials. It is further distinguished between electrical and optical PUFs. The
major drawback of optical PUFs is their high complexity especially for readout, making
them non-applicable for the integration into lightweight electronic devices and systems.
In particular, PE-based electrical PUFs can benefit from larger variations compared to
silicon counterparts, which makes hardware-intrinsic security very promising. Since the
variations are induced randomly and uncontrollably during the manufacturing process, no
additional non-volatile memory (NVM) is necessary to store the identifiers. The identifiers
are derived from the inherent variations on demand and discarded in the binary form if
not used. This prevents from attacks such as memory leakage, which is one of the major
security threats when using NVMs even if the device is powered off. Due to the so-called
’chain of trust’ the genuineness of the immutable identifiers belonging to the root of trust
is of the greatest importance. Printed PUFs in combination with decentralized manufac-
turing further strengthen the root of trust compared to foundry-fabricated silicon-based
systems.
• Q2: How can a PUF be designed to meet the requirements for PE fabrication?
Printed electronics technology exhibits strict design and performance constraints, im-
posing special requirements regarding viable PUF types. The PUF quality parameters
introduced in Chapter 3 help to determine the essential requirements on PUFs for a
specific application scenario. Prior works introduced memory-based PUFs based on PE
technology. The advantage of using memory cells is their relatively simple challenge-
response interface. Thereby, the powering on of the memory cells is the challenge and the
response is directly accessible in binary form. However, the scaling factor is very low if
using memory cells to implement PUFs. For many applications it is desired to achieve
non-linear challenge-response pair (CRP) growth when scaling up the PUF circuit. As a
consequence, the design requirements on PE-based PUFs are mainly dependent on the
desired scalability and simplicity of the challenge-response interface, which is the basis
for the DiffC-PUF design. The DiffC-PUF is based on inverter structures, each comprising
one resistor and one field effect transistor. The architecture allows arbitrary addressing
and grouping of inverter pairs to be evaluated for response generation. As a consequence,
the CRP space increases non-linearly with the number of PUF core inverters used.
• Q3: How can the PUF characteristics be measured and the security performance be
evaluated?
To enable large-scale characterization it is essential to develop an evaluation platform,
as introduced in Chapter 3. The PUF characteristics are experimentally measured for
silicon-based PUF cores in Chapter 4. Based on the PUF responses extracted under
different operating conditions, the security metrics can be evaluated as introduced in
Chapter 2. In Chapter 5, in the first instance the hybrid PUF incorporating printed PUF
cores is characterized based on simulations. This allows to verify the characteristics to
be expected from the fabricated devices. To evaluate the security metrics, it is essential
to consider all possible operating conditions. Finally, the fabricated hybrid PUFs are
characterized under changing operating conditions, including variations in the ambient
temperature, relative humidity, and inverter supply voltage. The investigated security
metrics include uniqueness, reproducibility, bit aliasing, and uniformity. The computed
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metrics based on the experimental data obtained from the silicon-based PUF cores show
values close to ideal. The experimental results for the PE-based hybrid PUFs show an
almost ideal uniqueness value of 51.1 %. The bit aliasing and uniformity values show,
that the measured PUF responses are biased towards 0. Nonetheless, the results are in
good statistical agreement with the simulations. The determined security metrics show
promising results and indicate the suitability of the hybrid PUF as a security primitive.
The investigations of the reproducibility show, that the missing passivation for the EGTs
degrades the robustness of the PUF response generation. In particular, changing ambient
conditions such as temperature and humidity have effects on the electrical characteristics
of the PE-based PUF core circuit.With amean reliability value of 78.5 %, the hybrid PUF’s
operational areas are currently limited to indoor applications, where the ambient operating
conditions are more stable. Compared to other works, this is the first comprehensive study
on PE-based PUFs in terms of security metrics, computed on the basis of experimentally
measured PUF responses.
• Q4: Which security threats do arise for PE-based PUFs?
In Chapter 2, a comprehensive overview on security threats for PUFs in general including
eavesdropping, model-based, and machine learning attacks is given. The security analysis
in Chapter 6 deals with security threats against PE-based PUFs. Due to the contrary
properties of PE compared to silicon technology, new security threats do arise, especially
concerning invasive attacks and tampering. The large-area fabrication capabilities, which
is one of the major advantages of PE technology, allows to measure internal circuit
characteristics with relatively low equipment overhead, if the attacker has physical access
to the PUF. Furthermore, the eavesdropped information can be used to perform model-
based attacks, e.g. by using sorting algorithms or by training machine learning models
including logistic regression (LR), random forest (RF), and multi-layer perceptron (MLP).
Thereby, the learnability of the PUF-internal behavior mainly depends on the employed
challenge buildingmethod, as described in Section 3.2.3. If using the readdressingmethod,
the binary relations (BR) sorting algorithm and the MLP achieve prediction accuracies of
≥ 90 % if at least 25 % of the sub-CRPs are used for model training. Compared to other
PUF types such as arbiter PUFs, our results show that the hybrid PUF is less vulnerable
against model-based attacks. From an attacker’s point of view, the BR-sort algorithm is
a promising alternative to machine learning algorithms, since it exhibits shorter training
times and it requires less computational performance.
• Q5: Which potential target applications do exist for the proposed PE-based PUF?
In general, PUFs are used for identification, authentication, and cryptographic key ge-
neration. In identification and authentication, the uniqueness and reproducibility of the
generated keys are of greatest importance. On the other hand, cryptography impose re-
quirements in terms of unpredictability and uniformity. Potential target applications can
be determined on the basis of the security metrics. In this context, the intra hamming
distance (intra-HD) and inter-HD distributions of the PUF responses play a major role, as
introduced in Section 2.3.4. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 the evaluation methodologies are
given. The results of the experimental data obtained from silicon-based PUF cores using
the readdressing method show a false-acceptance-rate (FAR) and a false-rejection-rate
(FRR) of 1.57 % (-1.80) at the equal-error-rate (EER), respectively. The values in the bra-
ckets indicate the log10(·) notation of the percentual values. For the PE-based PUF cores,
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the simulation results show FAR and FRR values of 0.48 % (-2.32) at the EER for the
readdressing method. The experimental values are FAR=FRR=1.50 % (-1.83) and show
good agreement with the simulations. Another option is to use the differential challenge
building method, which improves the results to FAR=FRR=0.02 % (-3.61). Thereby, the
standard deviation of the inter-HD distribution is smaller, which reduces both the FAR and
FRR values. Many applications require FAR and FRR values of −6 or lower, which can
be achieved through additional post-processing steps, such as error-correction of the PUF
responses. Additional evaluations on the randomness of the PUF responses (please refer to
Section 5.6 for more information) show, that the differential addressing method is capable
of generating bit sequences that satisfy the NIST randomness tests for cryptography. The
main limitation for the fabricated hybrid PUFs arises from the relatively low reliability va-
lue, which is caused by the missing passivation of the printed electrolyte-gated field-effect
transistors (EGTs). For the time being, the requirements holding for identification tasks
can be addressed with the DiffC-PUF design. It is expected that authentication and cryp-
tographic applications can be targeted once passivation for the EGTs and post-processing
on the PUF responses are available. In Chapter 6, it has been found that PE-based PUFs
are vulnerable against invasive attacks, which is an issue to be addressed in the future.
Possible countermeasures include large-area printed protective coatings to prevent from
physical access.
In this thesis, we have performed statistical evaluations of the security metrics as well as a
comprehensive security analysis. In conclusion,we have shown that the PUFdesigned, simulated,
and fabricated in this thesis, has the potential to improve security for lightweight PE-based
electronic devices and systems.
7.2 Future Work
During the project, a number of additional questions came up. In the future, various research
directions can be pursued to improve the security capabilities of the PE-based PUF presented in
this thesis. This would also help to address applications, such as authentication and cryptographic
key generation.
• Transistor passivation and encapsulation
Introducing transistor (EGT) passivation and encapsulation would increase the resilience
against impacts originating from changing environmental conditions and aging. It is also
expected that bit errors are reduced and the reproducibility of the PUF responses can be
improved in general.
• Fully printed PUF
Since the research field of PE is still in the early stages compared to silicon technology,
many standard components such as multiplexers, operational amplifiers, and comparators
are missing or compatibility between different materials is not given. To reach the next step
of PUF-based security in lightweight printed electronic systems, it would be interesting
to push the potential of being fully printed to the next level.
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• Post-processing of PUF responses
Responses generated by PUFs are typically fuzzy, due to changing environmental impacts,
changing operating conditions, and aging effects. In silicon-based PUFs, it is common
practice to employ post-processing in terms of error correction to obtain stable responses.
This improves the reproducibility of the PUF responses by reducing the bit errors. As
a consequence, the intra-HD distribution changes and the mean value is likely to be
decreased. This should also improve the false-acceptance-rate (FAR) and false-rejection-
rate (FRR) values, which is necessary to improve the security capabilities by qualifying
for authentication and cryptographic applications.
• Tamper protection
In contrast to conventional silicon technology, printed electronics exhibits large-area struc-
tures. This raises security threats in terms of invasive attacks that can be performed with
relatively low effort and equipment overhead. One possible countermeasure could be
printed protective coatings to detect or prevent from invasive attacks and provide tamper
protection.
Besides these future directions, the foundations acquired in this thesis are interesting for the
research community in the field of cyber security. The comprehensive statistical analysis on the
basis of simulations and experimental data obtained from fabricated PE-based PUFs denote a
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